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THE SOCIAL ORIGINS OF INNOVATION
FAILURES
Laura G. Pedraza-Farin˜a*
This Article identifies and describes a crucial source of innovation fail-
ure—linked not to the market but to the structure of social relations that
underlie market transactions—that this Article terms social network inno-
vation failures. This source of innovation failure, however, has been ob-
scured by two assumptions in traditional market failure models of
innovation. First, market failure models frequently assume that public,
non-secret knowledge (or information) will flow freely among communi-
ties of innovators and be put to its optimal use. Second, market failure
models pay little attention to how good ideas emerge, assuming that good
ideas will follow from investment in research and development.
Social network failures are failures of social interaction. Drawing on
studies from the sociology of networks as well as original ethnographic
research in innovator communities, this Article develops a taxonomy of
social network innovation failures: (1) lack of social ties; (2) cognitive dis-
tance; and (3) different (or clashing) evaluative frames. It then illustrates
how these social network innovation failures are endemic in a wide variety
of fields, including computer science, mathematics, public health, and
medicine, allowing key pieces of publicly available knowledge and exper-
tise needed to solve complex problems to remain trapped in communities
of innovators that do not interact with each other. Understanding social
barriers to information flow is especially important in light of findings in
the sociology literature that breakthrough ideas arise from the work of
teams that bring together knowledge from cognitively-distant communities
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to find and frame new problems at their intersection. Breakthrough ideas
are rare precisely because of social network failures.
Not only does patent law fail to address these social barriers to innova-
tion, patent law, as currently designed, actually reinforces them. The as-
sumption that public knowledge is free flowing, as well as an emphasis on
problem-solving that assumes that problems to be solved are simply out
there, underlie the key patent law doctrines of novelty, obviousness, and
utility, often resulting in decisions that frustrate patent law’s fundamental
goal of incentivizing innovation. Correcting social network innovation fail-
ures requires reorienting patent doctrine to reward not only problem-solv-
ing but also problem-finding and problem-framing.
Identifying the social causes underlying innovation failures is essential to
the design of effective law and policy interventions. Just as market failure
analyses of innovation identified free-riding as a root cause of market inef-
ficiencies—justifying a property right in information as the targeted cure—
social network failure analyses identify the social organization and division
of knowledge as an independent cause of innovation failure that calls for
the design of new, targeted legal interventions. The three types of social
network failures identified in this Article recommend the reorganization of
innovation policy to prioritize the building of knowledge infrastructures
and the restructuring of research funding from a discipline-based to a
problem-based model.
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INTRODUCTION
MARKET failure analyses of innovation have shaped our mod-ern legal understanding of when and how governmental inter-vention is required to optimize innovation outcomes.1 Courts
and agencies tasked with interpreting patent statutes understand the role
of patent rights as correcting market failures.2 Legal scholars have relied
on market failure analyses to both justify the need for expansive patent
rights and to argue for changes in specific patent law doctrines.3 But these
1. See generally Kenneth Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources
for Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY 609 (Richard Nelson
ed., 1962) (Arrow’s analysis of the underproduction of information in an unregulated mar-
ket has been profoundly influential in shaping the current legal debate over the contours of
intellectual property and other innovation policies). See also infra Part I.
2. See infra Parts I.A, I.B, IV.B.
3. See, e.g., HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST § 1.3a at 1-10 (2014)
(“[A] fundamental principle of our economic system is the proposition that free market
competition will best ensure an efficient allocation of resources in the absence of a market
failure.”); WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 294–97 (2003); U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE
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analyses make important assumptions—reflected in patent law doc-
trine—about how new knowledge emerges and spreads across society
that have remained largely unexamined. This Article identifies and chal-
lenges these assumptions. In so doing, it uncovers, describes, and charac-
terizes a different type of innovation failure—what I term social network
innovation failure—that stems from the lack of social interaction among
communities with complementary knowledge or expertise. Social net-
work innovation failures prevent the flow of information necessary to
find, frame, and ultimately solve complex problems. Dismantling the as-
sumptions underlying market failure analyses and understanding this new
type of innovation failure are thus crucial steps to develop effective legal
interventions to foster breakthrough innovation. This is the aim of this
Article.
Traditional market failure narratives justify governmental intervention
in the market for innovation as necessary to correct the underproduction
of new information—the lifeblood of innovation.4 In a world without pat-
ents or other government subsidies, once an inventor discloses her inven-
tion to the public, others (“free-riders”) will be able to copy the invention
at a low cost—undercutting the innovator’s profits and preventing her
from recouping her research and development (R&D) expenditures.5
Knowing this ex ante, innovators will both underinvest in R&D and over-
invest in secrecy.6 By granting innovators the right to exclude others from
practicing their invention, patents make information appropriable—en-
couraging R&D investment, research disclosure, and market transactions
in information prior to commercialization.7
But hiding behind this traditional narrative are two interrelated as-
sumptions: that information, once disclosed, will flow to those innovators
who need it;8 and that new ideas will simply flow from increased R&D
INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 5–6
(2003); Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, The Inducement Standard of Patentability,
120 YALE L. J. 1590, 1593–96 (2011); F. Scott Kieff, IP Transactions: On the Theory &
Practice of Commercializing Innovation, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 727, 754 (2005) (turning to mar-
ket failure analysis to design policy and legal responses to information sharing). See also
infra Parts I.A, I.B.
4. See, e.g., Arrow, supra note 1, at 623. See also infra Part I.
5. See, e.g., Arrow, supra note 1, at 615; Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency:
Another Viewpoint, 12 J. LAW & ECON. 1, 10 (1969) (“[I]f information is to be produced
privately, its producers must be able to realize revenues from the use or sale of informa-
tion.”); Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71
U. CHI. L. REV. 129, 129 (2004) (describing the justification outlined here as the “standard
justification for intellectual property” in the United States). See also infra Part I.
6. See, e.g., infra Part I.
7. Cf. Amy Kapczynski & Talha Syed, The Continuum of Excludability and the Limits
of Patents, 122 YALE L. REV. 1900, 1908 (2013).
8. The origin of the “free flow of information” assumption stretches back to Thomas
Jefferson, who famously compared information to “fire, expansible over all space . . . inca-
pable of confinement or exclusive appropriation.” Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson,
(Aug. 13, 1813), in 13 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 333–35 (Andrew A. Lips-
comb & Albert Ellery Bergh eds., 1905). This assumption continues in present-day legal
analyses. See infra Part I.A.
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investment.9 What is wrong with this characterization of information as
free-flowing, and with this lack of analysis into how good ideas emerge in
the first place? After all, at first glance it appears indisputably true that,
once information is placed in the public domain, any innovator faced with
a particular problem will be able to search for and use that information, if
pertinent, to solve it. And analysis into how ideas emerge may seem a
fool’s errand—something as intangible as an idea may appear to be inex-
tricably linked with individual mental processes and capabilities.10 But
here’s what this analysis overlooks: public information and expertise
needed to solve complex problems is often not meaningfully available to
innovators facing those problems. It turns out that how individuals search
for information, what type of information they search for and where, is
strongly influenced by their membership in particular innovator commu-
nities.11 In turn, a growing literature in the sociology of networks shows
that highly successful and creative ideas and products (“breakthrough in-
novation”) emerge from the recombination and synthesis of knowledge
from cognitively distant innovator communities.12
To make this point more concrete, and to illustrate how challenging the
free-flow and origin of ideas assumption has important consequences for
current views of innovation policy and patent law, let us consider the fol-
lowing example:13
In 2013, three computer scientists solved a famous mathematical prob-
lem—the Kadison-Singer problem—that had “defied the best efforts of
some of the most talented mathematicians of the last 50 years.”14 The
Kadison-Singer problem was formulated in 1959 by two mathematicians
interested in quantum theory.15 It asks: can scientists extrapolate unique
information about a quantum system from a scenario in which not all
features can be observed or measured?16 At its core, the Kadison-Singer
problem deals with the ability of experimental physics to uniquely mea-
sure and describe reality. For the first two decades of its existence, and
despite its publication in mathematical journals, the Kadison-Singer prob-
lem remained the province of the C* algebra mathematics community—
in the words of an applied mathematician—”the most abstract nonsense
9. See infra Part I.B.
10. See Jessica Silbey, The Mythical Beginnings of Intellectual Property, 15 GEO. MA-
SON L. REV. 319, 320, 330 (2008) (arguing that patent law is structured around a “central
origin myth” that views the moment of creation as “enchanted”—and thus potentially
outside analytical scrutiny—and as . . . the “‘heart’ of what it means to be an inventor”).
11. See infra Part II.A.
12. See infra Parts II.B, II.C.
13. I am indebted to Erik Hovenkamp for bringing the Kadison-Singer problem to my
attention as an illustration of social network failures.
14. Peter G. Casazza & Janet C. Tremain, Consequences of the Marcus/Spielman/
Srivastava Solution of the Kadison-Singer Problem, in NEW TRENDS IN APPLIED HAR-
MONIC ANALYSIS 191, 191 (A. Aldroubi et al. eds., 2016).
15. See Erica Klarreich, Outsiders Crack 50-Year-Old Math Problem, QUANTA MAG.,
Nov. 24, 2015, at 2.
16. See Nikhil Srivastava, The Solution of the Kadison-Singer Problem, Video Tutorial,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lnRHuuMjKrQ [https://perma.cc/UD88-CKNB].
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that exists in mathematics,” of which “[n]obody outside the area knows
much.”17 Then, in 1979, an applied mathematician “popularized the prob-
lem” by showing that it was equivalent to a question in mainstream math-
ematics about whether matrices could be broken up into smaller
chunks.18 Viewed under this new light, solving the Kadison-Singer prob-
lem quickly became a key undertaking in mathematics and engineering—
giving rise to multiple partial solutions, but no complete solutions.19
Finally, in 2008, a computer scientist at Yale University, Daniel
Spielman, spoke with his colleague, mathematician Gil Kalai, about his
current research project, which focused on how to “sparsify” a computer
network “so that it has fewer connections between nodes but still pre-
serves the essential features of the original network.”20 To mathematician
Kalai, Spielman’s research problem was a version of the Kadison-Singer
problem—a problem Spielman had never even heard of.21 Indeed,
Spielman knew nothing of C* algebra either. But when framed as a spar-
sifying problem, Spielman and his team were able to provide a solution in
five years—using tools that mathematicians are still struggling to under-
stand.22 It is misleading, however, to say that the computer scientists
alone solved a problem that had stumped mathematicians. Rather, math-
ematicians, using their expertise, were able to provide only part of the
answer to the puzzle. Computer scientists had the expertise to solve the
last part. As one member of Spielman’s team put it: “I think the reason
why this problem lasted 50 years is because it really had two parts that
were hard.”23 In other words, solving it required the collective expertise
of two communities (mathematics and computer science) that rarely in-
teracted with each other.24
What does this example illustrate? First, rather than being free flowing,
public knowledge is often not in fact meaningfully accessible to innova-
tors faced with a particular problem because of reasons related to the
social organization of knowledge-making. Modern knowledge-making is
organized in very specialized, small subfields that often do not communi-
cate with each other and, as a consequence, are not aware (or cannot
interpret) each other’s research questions, findings, and ways of framing
those questions. Thus, despite being nominally public, knowledge about
the Kadison-Singer problem remained trapped within the C* algebra
community for two decades and within the mathematics, applied mathe-
matics, and engineering communities for the following thirty years. Im-
portantly, knowledge about the Kadison-Singer problem traveled
through person-to-person interactions—notably those between Kalai and
17. Klarreich, supra note 15, at 3.
18. Klarreich, supra note 15.
19. See, e.g., Klarreich, supra note 15, at 1; Dana Mackenzie, Kadison-Singer Problem
Solved, 47 SIAM NEWS (2014).
20. Klarreich, supra note 15, at 1.
21. Klarreich, supra note 15, at 1.
22. Klarreich, supra note 15, at 1.
23. Klarreich, supra note 15, at 6.
24. See infra Part III.B.
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Spielman—not through reading publicly available knowledge. Second,
solving complex problems often requires the combination of multiple ex-
pertises that reside in non-interacting communities. In the example
above, solving the Kadison-Singer problem required interaction between
mathematicians and computer scientists. Such interaction facilitated the
translation, or re-framing, of the problem from C* algebra language to
that of computer science and allowed computer scientists to use their
tools to finally reach a complete solution to the problem. Indeed, since
solving the Kadison-Singer problem, mathematicians have held several
workshops to create teams that unite the disparate fields of C* algebra
and computer science.25
This last point—the need for teams that combine multiple subspecial-
ties and multiple types of expertises to solve complex problems—brings
us back to the second assumption in market failure analyses of innova-
tion: assumption that good ideas will simply arise from investment in re-
search and development. In contrast, a rich body of work in the sociology
of networks and the sociology of science has long been preoccupied with
understanding both how knowledge travels and how good ideas emerge.26
That work has provided mounting empirical evidence that a crucial step
in idea generation—but one that is underappreciated in both patent law
doctrine and theory—is problem finding and problem framing.27 Once a
problem is sharply defined, the steps to its solution frequently reveal
themselves.28 Viewed in this way, to think about innovation as beginning
with a pre-existing problem and ending with product development is to
overlook the most important steps that lead to idea-generation: finding
and framing the problem that a particular idea is attempting to solve. In
turn, “generating new problems, new knowledge and new capabilities (as
opposed to transferring already accepted ideas)”29 requires deep and fre-
quent interaction between cognitively-distant communities.30
The solution of the Kadison-Singer problem is a powerful illustration
of this point: its solution required recognizing that the “sparsifying” prob-
lem facing computer scientists was the same as the “linear algebra matri-
ces” problem in the several mathematics subcommunities—an example of
problem-framing.31 Nevertheless, as the history of the Kadison-Singer
problem also shows, the social division of knowledge in non-interacting
communities of innovators hampers meaningful information flow be-
tween cognitively distant communities, in turn delaying problem-finding
and problem-framing.
The Kadison-Singer problem and its solution involve abstract mathe-
25. See infra Part III.B.
26. See infra Part II.
27. See infra Parts II.B, II.C.
28. Infra Parts II.B, II.C.
29. Balazs Vedres & David Stark, Structural Folds: Generative Disruption in Overlap-
ping Groups, 115 AM. J. SOC. 1150, 1158 (2010).
30. Id. See also case studies infra Part III.
31. See Srivastava, supra note 16.
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matics of the type that is not the subject of patent protection.32 Neverthe-
less, the basic dynamics of knowledge-making and organization in
innovator communities illustrated by this example, as I show in Parts II
and III, is reproduced in more applied fields that lead to patentable inno-
vations. Indeed, recognizing social network innovation failures has im-
portant implications for patent law doctrine and theory, as well as for
innovation law and theory more broadly.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the influence of market failure models in
the development of patent law doctrine and theory, the important legal
doctrines of novelty, obviousness, and utility also reflect these twin as-
sumptions. Specifically, relying on market failure models of innovation,
courts have systematically widened the amount of information (or prior
art) that is considered accessible to a person having ordinary skill in the
art.33 While advances in information technology justify casting an increas-
ingly wider net over the amount and types of information available to
innovators, persistent social barriers effectively limit the availability of
some types of information. Yet, the key doctrinal test that is meant to
cabin the reach of prior art—the analogous art doctrine—lacks a princi-
pled way to distinguish between accessible and inaccessible prior art. And
just as market failure analyses of innovation pay little attention to the
origin of good ideas, so does patent law, through its utility and obvi-
ousness doctrines, often assume that problems to be solved are simply out
there.34 This stylized view of what constitutes prior art, and the focus on
problem-solving to the exclusion of problem-finding and framing, is out
of sync with real world research. And it can have the unintended conse-
quence of discouraging the very type of boundary-crossing teamwork that
leads to breakthrough discoveries.
These assumptions feature prominently in recent cases such as Apple v.
Samsung.35 Two key questions in Apple were whether Apple’s “slide to
unlock” patent that solved a “pocket dialing” problem was an obvious
extension of touchscreen technology for home security systems, and how
to define the relevant field of endeavor.36 When faced with conflicting
versions of what constitutes a field of endeavor, or how to conceptualize
the “problem to be solved,”37 the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court
have often relied on “common sense” to effectively come up with their
own way of framing the problems facing innovators.38 But in Apple, un-
32. See Alice Corp. Pty., Ltd. v. CLS Bank Intern., 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014).
33. See infra Part IV.A. Obviousness.
34. See infra Part IV.B. Obviousness and Utility.
35. Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elec. Co., Ltd., 816 F.3d 788 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See infra
Parts I.A, IV.B (providing an in-depth analysis of the Apple v. Samsung and other relevant
cases).
36. 816 F.3d at 798, 802.
37. See infra Part IV.B.
38. See, e.g., Apple v. Samsung, 816 F.3d at 809 (“Considering the ‘reality of the cir-
cumstances—in other words, common sense,’ a skilled artisan would have considered
Xrgomics to be within the scope of the art searched.”) (quoting In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d
1443, 1447 (Fed. Cir. 1992)). See also infra Part IV.B.
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derstanding that both security system and cell phone designers faced sim-
ilar design problems, and framing the problem of designing a user
friendly interface for home entertainment and security systems as one
that applies to the problem of “pocket dialing” may, in itself, be an inno-
vative contribution—particularly if these two communities were not in
routine communication.39
Much like the solving of the Kadison-Singer problem, which required
recognizing that the “sparsifying” problem facing computer scientists was
the same as the “linear algebra matrices” problem in the several mathe-
matics subcommunities, a key step in Apple’s innovation may have been
framing the “pocket dialing” problem as a problem addressed by home
security systems.40
At a minimum, addressing social network failures requires confronting
how incorrect assumptions about information flow and the origin of ideas
manifest themselves in patent law doctrine and designing tools—which
can involve the use of network analysis itself41—to address them. Under-
standing social network failures in innovation, however, has important
implications beyond identifying and correcting these misconceptions in
patent doctrine. Social network failure analysis provides a new justifica-
tion for governmental intervention in innovative activity, rooted in hur-
dles created by the social organization and division of knowledge. In turn,
designing effective interventions requires both an in-depth understanding
of the causes of social network failures and a comparative analysis of
multiple innovation policy levers—including, in addition to patents,
grants, prizes, taxes, and private mechanisms—to identify the optimal
combination of incentives to mitigate them.42
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Part I identifies and
challenges the twin underlying assumptions in market failure models of
innovation: (1) that non-secret knowledge will tend to flow freely across
communities; and (2) that ideas preexist (and are exogenous to) any rele-
vant analysis of innovation. Part II introduces the reader to the literature
in the sociology of networks. This literature provides the theoretical back-
ground to challenge these two assumptions and to highlight a crucial
source of innovation failure that has been overlooked by legal scholars—
what I term “social network failures in innovation.” Part III develops the
concept of social network failures in innovation through three case stud-
ies in public health, computer science/mathematics, and medical research.
The case studies draw both from my original empirical research and from
research by other network scholars. Through these case studies, I develop
a taxonomy of social barriers to the flow of information and to the forma-
tion of boundary-crossing teams to address complex problems. Part IV
turns from patent theory to patent doctrine. It shows how these twin as-
39. See infra Parts I.A, IV.B.
40. Infra Parts I.A, IV.B.
41. See infra Part IV.C.
42. See infra Part V.
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sumptions pervade patent law doctrine and proposes the redesign of util-
ity, obviousness, and novelty law to align them with the realities of how
research happens on the ground, including by deploying network analytic
tools themselves to map relevant communities of practice. Part V con-
cludes by analyzing the implications of social network failures for innova-
tion theory and policy more broadly. In particular, it begins a crucial
conversation: how can policy instruments, including but not limited to
patents, address the particular barriers created by social network fail-
ures—(1) lack of social-cognitive ties; (2) cognitive distance; and (3) dif-
ferent (or clashing) evaluative frames—as identified in this Article?
I. MARKET FAILURES IN INNOVATION
Traditional justifications for granting intellectual property rights to in-
novators are grounded upon the failure of market mechanisms to effi-
ciently supply knowledge goods.43 Both theoretical models of innovation
and empirical studies find that market competition alone will generate
investment in research and development that is quite below what is so-
cially optimal.44 As Kenneth Arrow theorized in 1962, three interrelated
characteristics of information and information-rich goods—(1) uncer-
tainty; (2) inappropriability (or non-excludability); and (3) indivisibilities
(or non-rivalry in consumption)—explain why markets will fail to pro-
duce socially optimal levels of innovation.45 First, a crucial feature of in-
vestment in R&D is great uncertainty about the likelihood of success of
any given research project. Absent some form of insurance against fail-
ure,46 the market will tend to discriminate against high-risk, high-variance
projects.47
The last two characteristics of information, inappropriability (or non-
excludability) and indivisibility (or non-rivalry in consumption), are com-
monly treated together as the “public goods” problem of information and
43. See, e.g., Brett M. Frischmann, Michael J. Madison, & Katherine J. Strandburg,
Governing Knowledge Commons, in GOVERNING KNOWLEDGE COMMONS 12–13, 16 (Brett
M. Frischmann et al. eds., 2014) (describing the traditional argument for intellectual prop-
erty protection).
44. See, e.g., Arrow, supra note 1, at 619 (modeling underinvestment in knowledge
goods); Bronwyn Hall, The Private and Social Returns to Research and Development, in
TECHNOLOGY, R&D, AND THE ECONOMY 140–83 (Bruce L.R. Smith & Claude E. Barfield
eds., 1996); Nicholas Bloom, Mark Schankerman & John Van Reenen, Identifying Technol-
ogy Spillovers and Product Market Rivalry, 81 ECONOMETRICA 1347, 1349 (2013) (finding
that “the (gross) social rate of return to R&D exceeds the private return,” which implies
“under-investment in R&D, with the socially optimal level being over twice as high as the
level of observed R&D”); Stephen Martin & John T. Scott, The Nature of Innovation Mar-
ket Failure and the Design of Public Support for Private Innovation, 29 RES. POL’Y 437, 438
(2000); Richard Nelson, The Simple Economics of Basic Scientific Research, 49 J. POL.
ECON. 297, 297 (1959) (modeling underinvestment in basic scientific research).
45. Arrow, supra note 1, at 609.
46. See Arrow, supra note 1, at 616.
47. Arrow, supra note 1, at 616 (“By the very definition of information, invention must
be a risky process, in that the output (information obtained) can never be predicted per-
fectly from the inputs.”).
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information goods.48 This problem can be summarized as follows: if infor-
mation is to be produced by the market, innovators must be able to ob-
tain revenues from the sale of information or of information-containing
goods (or to “appropriate” the social benefits of their innovation).49 In
turn, this requires sellers of information to be able to exclude other, non-
paying users (or “free riders”) from accessing that information.50 But it is
comparatively much more difficult to exclude others from using knowl-
edge resources once these resources are disclosed than to exclude others
from using real or personal property. This is because consumption of in-
formation is non-rivalrous: enjoyment of a particular piece of knowledge
by any one person does not preclude its enjoyment by others.51 In con-
trast there are a sharply limited number of people who can simultane-
ously enjoy a parcel of land or an item of personal property.
A market in information itself will also be inefficient because of what
researchers have termed Arrow’s “disclosure [or information] para-
dox.”52 Arrow explains the paradox as follows: “[T]here is a fundamental
paradox in the determination of demand for information; its value for the
purchaser is not known until he has the information, but then he has in
effect acquired it without cost.”53 The disclosure paradox affects the abil-
ity of innovators to contract with others to commercialize their innova-
tions. On the one hand, investors and manufacturers need access to the
inventor’s new knowledge in order to decide whether they want to invest
in developing and commercializing the innovation. Yet, the innovator has
no guarantee that, after she has disclosed her new knowledge, the puta-
tive investor or manufacturer won’t simply take it for free. The paradox is
thought to lead to an inefficient organization of labor—encouraging inno-
vators to commercialize their own inventions even if they are not in the
best position to do so, and discouraging R&D collaboration across
firms.54
This market failure narrative justifies some form of governmental inter-
vention in the market for information and information-rich goods. Patent
rights are one such form of intervention: by enabling innovators to ex-
clude others from using the fruits of their research and development, pat-
ents make information (more) appropriable.55 Patents are intended to
address three problems identified in market failure analyses: the under-
48. See, e.g., Brett M. Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Com-
mons Management, 89 MINN. L. REV. 917, 939–49 (2005).
49. See, e.g., id. at 943–46.
50. See, e.g., id. at 946.
51. See, e.g., id.
52. See, e.g., Michael J. Burstein, Exchanging Information Without Intellectual Prop-
erty, 91 TEX. L. REV. 227, 229 (2012) (describing Arrow’s disclosure paradox).
53. Arrow, supra note 1, at 615.
54. See, e.g., Jonathan M. Barnett, Intellectual Property as a Law of Organization, 84 S.
CAL. L. REV. 785, 816 (2011) (arguing that weak or no patent regimes can foster excessive
(and inefficient) levels of integration in firms).
55. See, e.g., Nancy Gallini & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property: When Is It the
Best Incentive System?, in 2 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 51, 54 (Adam B.
Jaffe et al. eds., 2002).
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investment in R&D, the disincentive for information disclosure between
innovators and commercializers arising from Arrow’s disclosure paradox,
and the inefficient prioritization of research that can be kept as a trade
secret.56 They do so by allowing the creation of a market in information
and information-rich goods that fosters R&D investment and transac-
tions in information, and that guides innovative efforts towards inven-
tions society values the most through the use of the price system.57
Patents, however, are not without costs. By putting a positive price on
information, patents create deadweight loss—consumers who would oth-
erwise purchase information-rich goods priced at the marginal cost of
production are excluded from the market.58 The role of patent law in
addressing specific types of market failures is depicted below in Figure 1.
Market Failure Cure
• Free-riding • Monopoly pricing through exclusive
property rights (patent law)
• Over-investment in secrecy • Protection for disclosed information
• Inefficient horizontal integration in through exclusive property rights
firms (patent law)
• Inefficient transactions in
information
• Under-commercialization of • Increased patent term59
innovations • Special “commercialization
patents”60
Figure 1: Designing Innovation Policy to Cure Market Failures
Patents, of course, are not the only type of governmental intervention
that can correct market failures. For example, direct governmental subsi-
dies of research and development in the form of grants or prizes can serve
the same purpose.61 The latter two mechanisms solve the public goods
problem of information not by making it more appropriable in the mar-
56. See, e.g., id. at 54–55.
57. See Demsetz, supra note 5, at 14 (“The indivisibility problem may very well be
handled best by a private property system that reduces the cost of contracting and raises
the cost of free-loading while, at the same time, it provides incentives and guidance for
investment in producing information.”); Kapczynski & Syed, supra note 7, at 1908.
58. See, e.g., Gallini & Scotchmer, supra note 55, at 54; Amy Kapczynski, The Cost of
Price: Why and How to Get Beyond Intellectual Property Internalism, 59 UCLA L. REV.
970, 982 (2012).
59. William Nordhaus provided the classic economic analysis of patent term, arguing
that the optimal patent term balances incentives to encourage innovation against
inefficiencies associated with monopoly rights. WILLIAM NORDHAUS, INVENTION, GROWTH
AND WELFARE 76 (1969); see also Michael Abramowicz, The Danger of Underdeveloped
Patent Prospects, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 1065, 1066–67 (2007); F.M. Scherer, Nordhaus’
Theory of Optimal Patent Life: A Geometric Reinterpretation, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 422, 427
(1972).
60. See, e.g., Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 341
(2010).
61. See, e.g., Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the Patents—Prizes
Debate, 92 TEX. L. REV. 303, 303 (2013); Benjamin N. Roin, Intellectual Property Versus
Prizes: Reframing the Debate, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 999, 1001 (2014); Steven Shavell &
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ket but by severing compensation for research and development from any
charge to the users of information.62 This is how basic research is (mostly)
funded.63 The products of basic research are not sold on the market but
are generally available to the public. Much has been written about the
comparative advantages and disadvantages of prizes vs. grants vs. patents
in fostering innovation.64 What all of these writings have in common is
that market failure analyses serve as the lodestar in all comparative eval-
uations of the merits and demerits of different institutional arrangements
to foster innovation.65 The question all comparative analyses ask is: given
our understanding of why markets fail to optimally induce innovation,
which type of intervention can best cure market failures?66 For example,
commentators who argue that prizes are superior to patents provided the
government can accurately calculate the size of the reward, emphasize
the ability of prizes to place new knowledge in the public domain thus
avoiding the deadweight loss of monopoly pricing.67 The centrality of
market failure analyses in developing and comparing different policy in-
terventions to foster innovation make it all the more pressing to uncover
two unstated assumptions in market failure models: the free flow of infor-
mation assumption, and the exogenous treatment of ideas. I undertake
this task in the next subsection.
A. ASSUMPTION ONE: INFORMATION’s Tendency to Flow Freely
Arrow’s foundational work, and the work of many law and economics
scholars that build upon it, begins with the fundamental assumption that
knowledge has a tendency to diffuse across society once it is revealed and
that efforts to control its spread will, at best, minimize but not completely
contain it. Before illustrating this point, let us be clear that Arrow himself
emphasized that this characteristic of information was altogether desira-
ble from a static efficiency perspective (that is, taking a snapshot of soci-
ety).68 From a static perspective, existing information would be put to its
most efficient use if it were freely available to anyone who wants to use
it.69 But from a dynamic perspective (taking into account the effect of
free access on future producers of knowledge goods), free distribution of
Tanguy Van Ypersele, Rewards Versus Intellectual Property Rights, XLIV J. L. ECON. 525,
525 (2001).
62. See, e.g., Hemel & Oullette, supra note 61.
63. See generally Nelson, supra note 44.
64. See, e.g., Hemel & Ouelette, supra note 61; Roin, supra note 61; Shavell & Yper-
sele, supra note 61.
65. See, e.g., Hemel & Ouelette, supra note 61, at 304–05; Roin, supra note 61, at
1001–03; Shavell & Ypersele, supra note 61, at 526–27.
66. See Gallini & Scotchmer, supra note 55, at 52.
67. See, e.g., Roin, supra note 61, at 1025; Shavell & Ypersele, supra note 61, at
529–30.
68. See Arrow, supra note 1, at 616–17 (“[A]ny information obtained . . . should, from
the welfare point of view, be available free of charge (apart from the cost of transmitting
information). This insures optimal utilization of the information but of course provides no
incentive for investment in research.”).
69. See Arrow, supra note 1, at 616–17.
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information now existing creates disincentives to the production of new
information.70 The debate as to whether prizes or patents are optimal
innovation incentives centers in large part on whether limiting the spread
of information by propertizing it through patent law is more efficient in
incentivizing the creation of new information than rewarding informa-
tion-creators with prizes, while placing new information in the “public
domain.”71 For the purpose of this Article, however, the merits and de-
merits of arguments on each side of the debate are not important. What is
important is that Arrow’s initial treatment of information as freely diffus-
ible has been taken up both by proponents of intellectual property rights
and by proponents of alternative mechanisms to incentivize innovation,
who prioritize access to new information. For this reason, I begin by illus-
trating Arrow’s approach to the nature of information. I then provide
examples of how this treatment of information as freely diffusible has
been taken up both by proponents and detractors of strong intellectual
property rights.
In his elaboration of why it is difficult to create an efficient market for
information, Arrow explains:
The cost of transmitting a given body of information is frequently very
low. . . . In the absence of special legal protection, the owner cannot,
however, simply sell information on the open market. Any one pur-
chaser can destroy the monopoly, since he can reproduce the infor-
mation at little or no cost. . . . With suitable legal measures,
information may become an appropriable commodity. Then the mo-
nopoly power can indeed be exerted. However, no amount of legal
protection can make a thoroughly appropriable commodity of some-
thing so intangible as information. The very use of the information in
any productive way is bound to reveal it, at least in part.72
Note how Arrow leads his analysis with two clearly stated propositions.
First, transmitting information is cheap and easy. Second, even with “suit-
able legal measures” (i.e. intellectual property rights), information will
continue to spread. In fact, it is in the nature of information as an intangi-
ble, hard to delineate commodity, to do so. Indeed, Arrow’s analysis in
the quoted paragraph is focused on the difficulties in containing knowl-
edge spillovers (or positive externalities) from innovative activity—even
though Arrow doesn’t use the term “spillovers.”73
70. See, e.g., Arrow, supra note 1, at 615; Demsetz, supra note 5, at 10–11; Brett M.
Frischmann, The Pull of Patents, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2143, 2156 (2009). In his critique of
Kenneth Arrow’s analysis in “Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for In-
vention” for failing to engage in comparative institutional analysis, Harold Demsetz em-
phasizes precisely these dynamic effects of widespread use of now existing information on
its future production. Demsetz, supra note 5, at 11 (“Since one of the main functions of
paying a positive price is to encourage others to invest the resources needed to sustain a
continuing flow of production, the efficiency with which the existing stock of goods or
information is used cannot be judged without examining the effects on production.”).
71. See, e.g., Shavell & Ypersele, supra note 61, at 525.
72. Arrow, supra note 1, at 614–15 (emphasis added).
73. Knowledge spillovers are simply benefits from R&D (or positive externalities) that
“spill over” for third parties to exploit without having to pay for their use. For example,
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This focus on knowledge spillovers, and more specifically on how to
contain them, has been the motivation of much of law and economics
literature in patent law.74 Many scholars who emphasize the crucial role
of intellectual property rights in incentivizing innovation—by giving cre-
ators control over information goods they have created—build on Harold
Demsetz’s seminal article, Toward a Theory of Property Rights.75 There,
Demsetz suggested that an efficient property system would allow owners
to internalize externalities (both positive and negative) arising from their
productive activities.76 This argument, as applied to information goods,
has led to an emphasis on how to enable innovators to internalize spil-
lovers that flow naturally from knowledge goods’ or information’s ten-
dency to “be free.”77 This persistent focus on spillovers in the law and
economics literature on IP conjures up a view of information goods as
naturally and easily sharable.78 Indeed, although Demsetz criticizes Ar-
row for not engaging in comparative institutional analysis when con-
demning property rights as inefficient, he nonetheless agrees with
Arrow’s characterization of information as “freely available” in the ab-
sence of private property rights.79 Legal scholars writing within this tradi-
tional economic framework often make the same background
assumptions about the natural shareability of new information.80
“the very use of the information in any productive way,” as Arrow notes, at a minimum is
thought to reveal to competitors that a particular innovation is possible—an intra-industry
spillover. Arrow, supra note 1, at 615. And, as Lemley and Frischmann explain, spillovers
can also take place inter-industry since “[w]ork done in one field, such as defense or space
science, may have benefits in seemingly unrelated fields such as materials science. The
inventor may have no interest in or even awareness of the benefits her idea has in these
unrelated fields.” Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV.
257, 261 (2007).
74. See, e.g., Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 73, at 291–93 (describing the focus, in
the academic literature on patent law, on how to contain knowledge spillovers).
75. See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347
(1967).
76. Id. at 348.
77. R. Polk Wagner, Information Wants To Be Free: Intellectual Property and the My-
thologies of Control, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 995, 999 (2003) (“It turns out that information
does ‘want to be free.’”) (emphasis added) (quoting Paulina Borsook, Opinion, Art’s Cold
Welcome on the Web, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2001).
78. The argument here is not that spillovers are unimportant. Rather, the persistent
focus on how information tends to spread unless controlled (i.e., on spillovers) has diverted
attention from all the ways in which information remains confined to the communities that
produce it and those others in their close network. It has also diverted attention from
studying how this confinement often has negative consequences for advances in our under-
standing of complex problems. It is only by foregrounding the “sticky” nature of knowl-
edge, and its uneven distribution in communities of practice that often do not interact with
each other that we can begin to understand how to design innovation tools that will allow
knowledge to flow more freely and productively across communities.
79. Demsetz, supra note 5, at 11, 12. Demsetz, however, suggested that patents have
an advantage over government subsidies in guiding the allocation of private resources to
the most valuable innovations because patents are responsive to market signals (through
prices) from consumers to producers. Demsetz, supra note 5, at 12–13.
80. For example, R. Polk Wagner argues that the “‘fencing’ of information is a re-
markably futile proposition,” because of a type of information spillover, which he terms
“Type III” information, that cannot be captured by intellectual property rights. Wagner,
supra note 77, at 999, 1004–05. And Oren Bar-Gill and Gideon Parchomovsky build on
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Scholars who study open innovation, and who often oppose efforts to
propertize information goods, nevertheless take a similar view of the nat-
ural shareability of information.81 A central concept in the literature on
open innovation is the idea of the “public domain.”82 As Pamela Samuel-
son and James Boyle have remarked, multiple conceptions of the public
domain coexist in the legal literature.83 But most of them are rooted in
analogies to open roads and parks, or in metaphors such as “free as the
air to common use” that suggest a homogeneous space where information
resides, free for the taking.84 Even those conceptions of the public do-
main that recognize its topography and focus on its capacity to enable
innovators to recombine and re-assemble knowledge resources tend to
assume that lack of private control and low access costs (enabled by tech-
nological advances) are sufficient to give rise to such participation.85
For example, in his pivotal work The Future of Ideas, Lawrence Lessig
argued that a key question for the management of knowledge resources is
“not whether the market or the state should control a resource, but
whether that resource should remain free.”86 In turn, a resource is free if
no permission is needed for its use, or if such permission is granted neu-
Arrow’s information paradox to propose the creation of property rights in ideas (in addi-
tion to the now-existing intellectual property protection for inventions, understood as the
concrete application of ideas). Oren Bar-Gill & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Marketplace for
Ideas?, 84 TEX. L. REV. 395, 396–97 (2005).
81. An important exception is recent work by Frischmann, Madison, and Strandburg
to map and characterize “knowledge commons”—a project that calls for detailed case
studies of how communities of innovators create and share knowledge on the ground, in-
cluding by mapping their interactions with institutional structures and incentives.
Frischmann et al., supra note 43, at ix–x.
82. See, e.g., James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of
the Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33 (2003); David Lange, Recognizing the
Public Domain, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147 (1981); Jessica Litman, The Public Do-
main, 39 EMORY L. J. 965 (1990); Pamela Samuelson, Enriching Discourses on Public Do-
mains, 55 DUKE L. J. 783 (2006).
83. Boyle, supra note 82, at 38–39; Samuelson, supra note 82, at 785–86.
84. Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing) (“The general rule of law is, that the noblest of human productions—knowledge,
truths ascertained, conceptions, and ideas—become, after voluntary communication to
others, free as the air to common use.”); see also Michael D. Birnhack, More or Better?
Shaping the Public Domain, in THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 60 (Lucie Guibault &
P. Bernt Hugenholtz eds., 2006) (“The public domain is . . . where knowledge is created
and where it lies awaiting new interpretations, new applications and new meanings. It is
not a graveyard, but a playground for speech-experiments.”).
85. See, e.g., Joel Mokyr, The Contribution of Economic History to the Study of Inno-
vation and Technical Change: 1750-1914, in 1 HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF TECHNI-
CAL CHANGE 15 (Bronwyn Hall & Nathan Rosenberg eds., 2010) (“Because total social
knowledge equals the union of all individual pieces of knowledge, the knowledge available
for technological advances was increasing, provided that those who could make best use of
it were able to access it. . . . What has assured the decline in access costs is that the technol-
ogy of access itself has been improving.”); Boyle, supra note 82, at 48 (“But we could hope
that much of [intellectual and inventive production] would be both free of centralized con-
trol and low cost or no cost. When the marginal cost of production is zero, the marginal
cost of transmission and storage approaches zero, the process of creation is additive, and
much of the labor doesn’t charge—well, the world looks a little different.”).
86. LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A
CONNECTED WORLD 12 (2001).
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trally.87 Lessig focuses on how the emergence of the internet facilitates
decentralized innovation by creating a commons where variously moti-
vated individuals have the opportunity to “draw upon resources without
connections, permission, or access granted by others.”88 The key step in
Lessig’s account is access—conceptualized as the opposite of control.
Once information is released from the chains of private control, individu-
als will “create—remixed films, new forms of music, digital art, a new
kind of storytelling, writing, a new technology for poetry, criticism, politi-
cal activism—and then, through the infrastructure of the Internet, share
that creativity with others.”89 In The Wealth of Networks, a path-breaking
work that brought the idea of “social production” of knowledge to the
forefront of intellectual property studies, Yochai Benkler describes the
rise of non-market models of innovation—made possible by the drastic
fall in access and dissemination costs spurred by the development of the
internet (what I have termed technological access costs).90 Like Lessig,
Benkler focuses our attention on the choice between access and control:
“To what extent will resources necessary for information production and
exchange be governed as a commons, free for all to use and biased in
their availability in favor of none?”91 The low costs of technological ac-
cess have changed the innovation landscape, so that “[a]ny person who
has information can connect with any other person who wants it, and any-
one who wants to make it mean something in some context, can do so.”92
Economic historian Joel Mokyr takes a similar approach, arguing that in-
creasing specialization coupled with drastically reduced access costs—
brought about by the printing press, the internet, and the expansion of
open science—have increased “total social knowledge” by ensuring that
“those who could make best use of it were able to access it.”93
These accounts take the main constraints to the productive recombina-
tion and use of information to be private control and lack of technologi-
cal access and, in some descriptions, also price.94 Once information is free
of these constraints, the main limits on the rate and direction of innova-
87. Id.
88. Id. at 85.
89. Id. at 9.
90. YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION
TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 1–4 (2006).
91. Id. at 23.
92. Id. at 32.
93. Mokyr, supra note 85, at 15.
94. See, e.g., BENKLER, supra note 90, at 139 (“[I]mprovements in the degree to which
these liberal commitments are honored and practiced emerge from new behaviors made
possible and effective by the networked information economy. These behaviors emerge now
precisely because individuals have a greater degree of freedom to act effectively, uncon-
strained by a need to ask permission from anyone.”) (emphasis added); Amy Kapczynski,
Access to Knowledge: A Conceptual Genealogy, in ACCESS TO KNOWLEDGE IN THE AGE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 17, 31 (Gae¨lle Krikorian & Amy Kapczynski eds., 2010)
(describing the Access to Knowledge movement’s conceptualization of the public domain
as synonymous with what is “open to all” both in terms of permission and price).
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tion are given by human creativity itself.95 But, as this Article shows,
human capacity is intimately bound with the communities in which each
individual is embedded and their knowledge structures and practices.96
To put it differently, we’ve stopped short of asking the next set of signifi-
cant questions: What does it mean in fact for information to be free of
legal encumberments? How is it in fact accessed by social actors? Are
there any other barriers to “accessibility”? And, switching vantage points
from seeking those conditions that enable individual autonomy and crea-
tivity to those that optimize resource management, why have complex
problems resisted study and treatment? As Julie Cohen reminds us in the
context of copyright policy, “[i]f creative practice entails the opportunistic
exploitation of a set of environmental resources, copyright policy must
pay close attention to the structure of that environment.”97 In the context
of copyright theory, Cohen has called for a “sociology of creative prac-
tice” that is “relational and network-driven,” and that recognizes that
human creativity both shapes and is shaped by the cultural
environment.98
1. The New Institutional Economics and Transaction Costs Economics
Approaches
Admittedly, this description of how law and economics scholarship has
tended to treat the flow of information is overly simplistic. Following
market failure models of innovation, two very related schools of eco-
nomic thought—Transaction-Costs Economics (TCE)99 and New Institu-
95. BENKLER, supra note 90, at 52 (“Given the zero cost of existing information and
the declining cost of communication and processing, human capacity becomes the primary
scarce resource in the networked information economy.”); LESSIG, supra note 86. Both
Benkler and Lessig’s approaches are self-consciously individualistic. They are both con-
cerned with individual freedom to participate in creative activities, defined as their capac-
ity for autonomous action. BENKLER, supra note 90, at 52–53; LESSIG, supra note 86, at
7–9, 12. In more recent work, Benkler has encouraged the further study of collaboration by
paying close attention to advances in the fields of not only psychology but also organiza-
tional sociology. Yochai Benkler, Law, Policy, and Cooperation, in GOVERNMENT AND
MARKETS: TOWARD A NEW THEORY OF REGULATION 311 (Edward J. Balleisen & David
A. Moss eds., 2010) (calling for the design of interventions that “set[ ] the social context so
that it facilitates cooperation among cooperators and allows selfish actors to be policed and
incentivized in ways that do not undermine the intrinsic motivation of the more coopera-
tive participants”).
96. See infra Parts II, III. See also Roger Guimera, Brian Uzzi, Jarrett Spiro & Luis A.
Nunes Amaral, Team Assembly Mechanisms Determine Collaboration Network Structure
and Team Performance, 308 SCIENCE 697, 697 (2005) (“Agents in creative enterprises are
embedded in networks that inspire, support, and evaluate their work.”).
97. Julie E. Cohen, Copyright, Commodification and Culture: Locating the Public Do-
main, in THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: IDENTIFYING THE COMMONS IN INFORMA-
TION LAW 154 (Lucie Guibault & P. Bernt Hugenholtz eds., 2006).
98. Id. at 146–56.
99. See, e.g., Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of
Contractual Relations, 22 J. LAW & ECON. 233 (1979); Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction
Cost Economics: The Natural Progression, 100 AM. ECON. REV. 673 (2010); Steven Tadelis
& Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction Cost Economics, in HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZA-
TIONAL ECONOMICS 159 (2012).
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tional Economics (NIE)100—have focused extensively on how transaction
costs, and institutional environments and formal rules, respectively, influ-
ence market transactions, including information exchanges. Those who
have studied access to information from this perspective have termed the
costs of information flow “access costs.”101 Access costs as studied by
NIE and TCE do not fully capture the barriers to information recombina-
tion that I describe in this Article. But leaving these concerns aside for
now, TCE scholars often identify access costs to then minimize them, as-
suming that advances in information technology will soon make access
costs negligible.102 As I show in Part III, simple access costs, that is, ac-
cess to publicly-available information, are often kept high by a pervasive
lack of social ties between communities with complementary
information.103
From a transaction-costs approach then, one way to conceptualize this
project is as identifying important, yet undervalued, transaction costs
among communities of innovators. I have not explicitly named these bar-
riers transaction costs in large part because traditional understandings of
transaction costs are quite different from the social network barriers I
describe in this Article. For example, TCE studies in law are most fre-
quently deployed to explain a firm’s “make or buy” decisions.104 TCE
predicts that firms will make an innovation in house when transaction
costs are high, but firms will buy the innovation in the market when trans-
action costs are low.105 In the first scenario, transaction costs are “inter-
nalized” and hierarchical decision-making replaces market
transactions.106 But two of the social network failures that I describe in
Part III (cognitive distance and different (or clashing) evaluative frames)
can persist inside firm hierarchies and are reflected in firms’ difficulties in
managing teams with diverse professional or disciplinary backgrounds.107
Further, the social network failures described in this Article go beyond
scholars’ traditional conceptualization of access costs. Social network fail-
100. See, e.g., OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND
ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS (1975); Oliver E. Williamson, The New Institutional Economics:
Taking Stock, Looking Ahead, 38 J. ECON. LIT. 595, 597 (2000). Williamson describes New
Institutional Economics as encompassing Transaction Costs Economics. Specifically, NIE
is concerned with studying (1) the institutional environment (e.g. formal rules, and prop-
erty rules in particular) and (2) governance structures that influence transactions among
parties. TCE is concerned primarily with (2) above: analyzing governance structures and
their impact on transaction costs.
101. See, e.g., Mokyr, supra note 85, at 15.
102. Id.; Fiona Murray & Siobha´n O’Mahony, Exploring the Foundations of Cumulative
Innovation: Implications for Organization Science, 18 ORG. SCI. 1006, 1008 (2007) (“But
for innovation to occur, knowledge must not just flow: Innovators must have the ability to
actually combine or accumulate knowledge.”).
103. See infra Part III.
104. See, e.g., Tadelis & Williamson, supra note 99, at 161 (“TCE was transformed into




107. See infra Part III.
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ures have less to do with access to information than with barriers to the
productive recombination of existing information to create new knowl-
edge. We may term these barriers “access and recombination” costs.
Fiona Murray and Siobha´n O’Mahony recognize a similar gap in current
organizational and economic analyses of cumulative innovation, calling
innovation scholars to “shift their emphasis from studies of knowledge
flows to examining the opportunities and constraints innovators confront
as they attempt to reuse, recombine, and accumulate knowledge.”108
What the case studies in Part III provide, then, is an in-depth exploration
of the origin of these barriers, so that targeted policy levers can be de-
signed to address them.
Despite these differences, the broader NIE approach has a lot in com-
mon with the network approach that I take here. In other work, I have
taken an NIE approach to studying the emergence of interdisciplinary
collaboration.109  Nevertheless, the network approach has some advan-
tages over NIE approaches. In particular, network analysis generates new
insights by shifting the unit of analysis from institutional environments
and formal rules, to informal, fluid communities and informal social
norms, which are often internalized by community members.110
It also bears emphasizing that other legal scholars have also challenged
the free flow of information assumption in traditional economic models
of innovation. For example, in his examination of the transfer of technol-
ogy from university laboratories to the private sector, Peter Lee has em-
phasized how ongoing relationships between universities and companies
were crucial to the transfer of tacit knowledge necessary to practice a
patented innovation.111 Lee’s research focuses on one important barrier
to the free flow of information: codified knowledge, in the form of a pat-
108. Murray & O’Mahoney, supra note 102, at 1006-07.
109. Laura Pedraza-Farin˜a, Constructing Interdisciplinary Collaboration: The Oncofer-
tility Consortium as an Emerging Knowledge Commons, in GOVERNING MEDICAL KNOWL-
EDGE COMMONS (Katherine J. Strandburg, Brett M. Frischmann & Michael J. Madison
eds., 2017). The methodology in this work follows a modified template from Elinor Os-
trom’s work on natural resource commons. Michael J. Madison, Brett M. Frischmann &
Katherine J. Strandburg, Constructing Commons in the Cultural Environment, 95 CORNELL
L. REV. 657 (2010). Ostrom’s approach is widely considered part of the NIE corpus.
110. Whether a “network approach” or a “new institutional economics” approach is
better suited to understand social relations has been the subject of vigorous debates on the
part of sociologists and economists. See, e.g., Rudolf Richter, New Economic Sociology and
New Institutional Economics, in ESSAYS ON NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 51 (2015)
(summarizing the debate). While economists emphasize transactions as the primary unit of
analysis, sociologists emphasize the importance of understanding embedded, underlying
social relations. See, e.g., Mark Granovetter, Economic Action and Social Structure: The
Problem of Embeddedness, 91 AM. J. SOCIOL., 481 (1985); Powell, (critiquing the transac-
tion cost approach); Paul DiMaggio, Cultural Aspects of Economic Organization and Be-
havior, in BEYOND THE MARKET PLACE: RETHINKING ECONOMY AND SOCIETY (R.
Friedland & A.F. Robertson, eds.1990) (emphasizing the importance of institutional cul-
ture); Williamson, supra note 100 [New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock] at 596-97
(describing four levels of social analysis and explaining that “level 1” analysis—the social
embeddedness level—is taken as a given by most institutional economists).
111. Peter Lee, Transcending the Tacit Dimension: Patents, Relationships, and Organi-
zational Integration in Technology Transfer, 100 CAL. L. REV. 1503, 1510–11 (2012).
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ent disclosure or a scientific publication, is often insufficient to teach
others how to practice the invention.112 Similarly, Michael Burstein has
challenged the corollary derived from Arrow’s information paradox: that
property rights in information are needed to foster transactions between
innovators and commercializers.113 Burstein points to the multidimen-
sional nature of information to argue that companies or inventors who
want to sell their innovation can often disclose sufficient information
about their innovation to potential developers to close a deal without re-
vealing crucial details about how to practice the invention—thus enabling
informational exchange without intellectual property protection.114 Both
Lee and Burstein focus on the multidimensional nature of information.
Lee emphasizes the tacit dimension of information, which makes infor-
mation harder to communicate than predicted under the “traditional
view” described in this Section.115 Burstein emphasizes how the multiva-
lent nature of information allows information producers to simultane-
ously reveal and conceal crucial information about an invention.116 This
Article builds upon these contributions but emphasizes a set of sepa-
rate—yet understudied—barriers to the free flow of information. These
barriers arise not from strategic moves by innovators to keep important
aspects of an invention secret during negotiations but from the architec-
ture of knowledge distribution itself: the division of knowledge in non-
interacting communities with different priorities, ways of framing
problems, and social norms.
As I show in Part IV, patent law doctrine itself, which is increasingly
shaped by market failure models of innovation, also reflects the free flow
assumption.
B. ASSUMPTION TWO: THE ORIGIN OF IDEAS
Market failure models of innovation take “ideas” as the logical starting
point. In other words, these analyses ask: assume you have an idea, how
would you go about turning it into a marketable product?117 Corpora-
tions, teams, or individuals simply “have” ideas. Understanding how and
why certain research and development investments lead to more innova-
112. Id. at 1509.
113. Burstein, supra note 52, at 247–48.
114. Burstein, supra note 52, at 247–48.
115. Lee, supra note 111, at 1523–24.
116. Burstein, supra note 52, at 247–48.
117. See generally Stephen J. Kline & Nathan Rosenberg, An Overview of Innovation,
in THE POSITIVE SUM STRATEGY: HARNESSING TECHNOLOGY FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH
275, 285 (Ralph Landau & Nathan Rosenberg eds. 1986) (describing the traditional “linear
model” of innovation, which begins with the black box of “research” but does not explore
the variables that influence how and what type of research a firm decides to undertake: “In
this model, one does research, research then leads to development, development to pro-
duction, and production to marketing.”); see also Arrow, supra note 1, at 616 (the starting
point of the analysis is the existence of a “desired new product or process” a firm wants to
develop); John Freeman & Jerome S. Engel, Models of Innovation: Startups and Mature
Corporations, 50 CAL. MANAG. REV. 94, 94 (“Innovation refers to a process that begins
with a novel idea and concludes with market introduction.”).
398 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70
tive outcomes while others fail or, in more colloquial terms, where partic-
ularly innovative ideas come from, is beyond the purview of market
failure analyses of innovation.118
Although legal scholarship is paying increasing attention to the path-
ways connecting ideas to marketable products, following traditional mar-
ket failure analyses, it has similarly neglected to examine the conditions
that lead to the generation of innovative ideas in the first place. For ex-
ample, Jonathan Barnett’s treatment of intellectual property as a law of
organization charts different facets of the innovation process.119 While
the steps leading from an “idea” to its “market release” are carefully
parsed and include “market analysis,” “research and development,”
“prototyping and testing,” “marketing,” “production,” and “distribu-
tion,” the steps that precede the formulation of the creative idea are
ignored.120
While market failure analyses of innovation, and law and economic
analyses of innovation more broadly, tend to blackbox the origin of
“good” ideas, legal opinions in patent law have tended to focus on a no-
tion of the “inventor” that is divorced from current sociological and psy-
chological understandings of creativity. Beginning with the now discarded
notion that a “flash of genius” is necessary for creative output, and con-
tinuing with patent law’s current skepticism towards “combination pat-
ents” (patents that combine elements from multiple patented
inventions),121 legal analysis systematically contravenes two key findings
from sociological literature about the origin of good ideas. First, innova-
tion emerges from recombination: good ideas are quite often the result of
unusual recombinations, rearrangements, and restructurings of elements
from distant cognitive domains.122 In this context, it makes little sense to
single out innovations that combine known elements from existing pat-
ents for special negative treatment. Second, two of the most important
hurdles to breakthrough innovation to address complex problems are
finding a problem to be solved and framing this problem in a way that can
be solved with existing techniques (or that points the way for new tech-
118. An important and growing body of literature has begun to harness the psychology
of creativity to counteract the assumption that ideas are exogenous to analyses of innova-
tion. See, e.g., Stephanie Plamondon Bair, The Psychology of Patent Protection, 48 CONN.
L. REV. 297 (2015); Jeanne C. Fromer, A Psychology of Intellectual Property, 104 NW. U. L.
REV. 1441 (2010); Gregory N. Mandel, To Promote the Creative Process: Intellectual Prop-
erty Law and the Psychology of Creativity, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1999 (2011); Andres
Sawicki, Risky IP, 48 LOY. U. CHI. L. REV. 81 (2016); see also JESSICA SILBEY, THE EU-
REKA MYTH: CREATORS, INNOVATORS, AND EVERYDAY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 5–6
(2015).
119. Barnett, supra note 54, at 811. See also Michael Mattioli, The Data Pooling Prob-
lem, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. (forthcoming, 2017) (analyzing the challenges, in Big Data
innovation, of pooling unpublished information privately held by multiple parties).
120. Barnett, supra note 54, at 790–91; see also Kieff, supra note 3, at 735–37 (empha-
sizing the “commercialization theory” of patents whereby patents are enforced by a prop-
erty rule to help facilitate commercialization of the invention, after it has been made).
121. See infra Part IV.
122. See infra Parts II, III.
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niques to be developed).123 For example, before the Kadison-Singer
problem described in the introduction was a “problem to be solved,”
Kadison and Singer had to do the crucial work of formulating it as such.
And before the problem could be fully solved, it had to be reframed (or
translated) from a physics/quantum mechanics problem to one of com-
puter science.124 But the patent law doctrines of obviousness and utility
focus almost exclusively on problem-solving.125 As a consequence, two
steps that are often critical to the formulation of good ideas are underap-
preciated and likely under-rewarded by current patent law doctrine.
I return to doctrinal implications in Part IV, which provides in-depth
analysis of how incorrect assumptions about the free flow of information
and the origin of ideas permeate patent law doctrine and proposes spe-
cific doctrinal solutions. But in order to fully appreciate the real-world
importance of correcting mistaken assumptions about information flow
and the origin of ideas, the next two Parts of this Article survey current
sociological research on social networks and innovation (Part II) and
work out a taxonomy of different types of social barriers to information
flow and idea generation in three separate case studies (Part III). Taken
together, these barriers to information and idea generation represent im-
portant, yet unexamined, social network failures in innovation.
II. SOCIAL NETWORKS AND INNOVATION: FROM
BROKERAGE TO STRUCTURAL FOLDS
The role of social relationships in the creation, transmission, and adop-
tion of new information has long been a subject of study in sociology.126
A growing body of theoretical and empirical research shows that the net-
works created by social relationships “influence the efficacy and effi-
ciency by which individuals and collectives create knowledge by affecting
their ability to access, transfer, absorb, and apply knowledge.”127 These
studies have collectively been termed “knowledge networks” research.128
A knowledge network is a set of nodes interconnected by relationships.
Nodes are locations in the social network where particular types of
knowledge are stored. Although nodes can be knowledge elements (such
as patents or products) or “non-human repositories of knowledge” (such
as databases), for the purpose of this Article, I will focus on the nodes
that are most studied by social scientists: those composed of individuals
or social collectives, such as teams and organizations. Relationships
123. See infra Parts II, III.
124. See infra Part III.B.
125. See infra Part IV.
126. See, e.g., Gautam Ahuja, Collaboration Networks, Structural Holes, and Innova-
tion: A Longitudinal Study, 45 ADMIN. SCI. QUART. 425, 426 (2000) (“Recently, however, a
few pioneering studies have explored network structure from the perspective of innovation
generation.”) (internal citations omitted); Ronald S. Burt, Structural Holes and Good
Ideas, AM. J. SOC. 349, 351–52 (2004) [hereinafter Structural Holes].
127. Corey Phelps, Ralph Heidl & Anu Wadhwa, Knowledge, Networks, and Knowl-
edge Networks: A Review and Research Agenda, 38 J. MGMT. 1115, 1117 (2012).
128. See id.
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among nodes both facilitate and restrict the creation, transfer, and ab-
sorption of knowledge.129
A. HOW INFORMATION FLOWS: STRUCTURAL HOLES AND
BROKERAGE IN INNOVATION
Crucial insights into how social relations impact the distribution of in-
formation (and hence the direction and pace of innovation) come from
work by sociologist Ronald Burt. Burt identified one particular feature in
the architecture of social networks—structural holes—as a key explana-
tory variable for the outcome of market competition—including identify-
ing winners and losers in product innovation and marketing.130 Structural
holes are discontinuities in social relationships. Structural holes can be
conceptualized as a void in the information matrix that prevents the free
flow of information among groups. For example, a structural hole is pre-
sent when two or more communities with potentially complementary in-
formation nonetheless contain no or very few members who interact with
each other across community lines. Structural holes that divide clusters of
dense social connections are not a rare occurrence but rather a defining
feature of our social structure.131 Burt hypothesized that “people who
stand near the holes in a social structure are at higher risk of having good
ideas[,]”132 by virtue of having access to more diverse information and
“alternative ways of thinking and behaving.”133 These actors, referred to
as “brokers”134 or “boundary spanners”135 in the terminology of sociol-
ogy of networks, can leverage their access to multiple knowledge commu-
nities to come up with ideas that others see as unusually “creative.”136
129. See, e.g., PETER R. MONGE & NOSHIR S. CONTRACTOR, THEORIES OF COMMUNI-
CATION NETWORKS 35 (2003).
130. RONALD S. BURT, BROKERAGE AND CLOSURE: AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL
CAPITAL (2005) [hereinafter BROKERAGE AND CLOSURE]; Structural Holes, supra note
126, at 388.
131. Structural Holes, supra note 126, at 351. (“The defining features of the social struc-
ture are clusters of dense connection linked by occasional bridge relations between clus-
ters.”); see infra Figure 2.
132. Structural Holes, supra note 126, at 349.
133. Structural Holes, supra note 126, at 349–50.
134. See, e.g., BROKERAGE AND CLOSURE, supra note 130; Lee Fleming & David M.
Waguespack, Brokerage, Boundary Spanning, and Leadership in Open Innovation Com-
munities, 18 ORG. SCI. 165, 165 (2007).
135. See, e.g., Rob Cross, Chris Ernst & Bill Pasmore, A Bridge Too Far? How Bound-
ary Spanning Networks Drive Organizational Change and Effectiveness, 42 ORG. DYNAM-
ICS 81, 88 (2013); Fleming & Waguespack, supra note 134.
136. See, e.g., Structural Holes, supra note 126, at 388–89.
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Figure 2: Structural Holes in Information Space
Figure 3: Brokers Occupy Structural Holes in Information Space
The concepts of “structural holes” and “brokerage” provide two theo-
retical contributions that challenge the “free flow” assumptions behind
traditional market failure models of innovation and that shed new light
on the origin of breakthrough ideas. First, because the architecture of
knowledge distribution is not smooth but lumpy, information that is nom-
inally accessible to the public—in the sense that it is not purposefully
kept secret—is often not meaningfully accessible to innovators. Structural
holes in our social relationships retard the meaningful flow of useful in-
formation across communities with few or no shared ties. As Burt puts it:
“Information does not spread evenly across the competitive arena. It isn’t
that players are secretive, although that too can be an issue. The issue is
that players are unevenly connected with one another [and] are attentive
to the information pertinent to themselves and their friends . . . .”137 Un-
derstanding how those structural holes are created, maintained, and
bridged is an important goal of many studies in the sociology of networks.
137. RONALD S. BURT, STRUCTURAL HOLES: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF COMPETI-
TION 13 (1992).
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Second, the emergence of “new ideas” is strongly influenced by the
lumpy architecture of knowledge distribution. In this view, innovation
emerges out of a process of “recombinant search,” where an individual’s
position in the network determines how she will search for information
and what type of information she will have most ready access to and find
most valuable.138 Innovators in a privileged (“brokerage” or “bridging”)
position in the network come up with the “best” ideas because they have
access to (and thus are able to combine) diverse elements from uncon-
nected communities.139
The Kadison-Singer problem described in the introduction is an addi-
tional example of brokerage. Indeed, it was only through the shared con-
nections of mathematician Gil Kalai to both computer science and
mathematics communities that the Kadison-Singer problem “migrated”
from mathematics to computer science.140 In this context, Kalai
“brokered” connections between mathematics and computer science by
transporting a problem from one community to another and by translat-
ing the Kadison-Singer problem’s mathematical formulation into a for-
mulation that could be understood—and eventually solved—by computer
scientists.
Thus far, I have focused (as does Burt) on an individual or entrepre-
neur’s position in the network as determining her ability to come up with
good ideas—or to act as a “broker.” In other words, I have focused on
the effect of an individual’s social network on her own creativity. But
there is a limit to the ability of a single person to successfully recombine
elements from distant communities, even if she has social connections to
members in these communities. There are two reasons for this: first, any
individual will be cognitively limited in her ability to understand dispa-
rate fields of study.141 Second, acquiring expert skills in any given field
requires “learning by doing”—that is, embeddedness in the relevant com-
munity of experts.142 It will be rare for a single individual to have access
138. See, e.g., Lee Fleming, Recombinant Uncertainty in Technological Search, 47
MGMT. SCI. 117, 118 (2001).
139. Empirical studies by Burt and others have found support for the structural holes
hypothesis in multiple contexts. See, e.g., Structural Holes, supra note 126, at 377 (showing
that managers who broker connections across structural holes in their organization are
more likely to have ideas that top managers consider “good ideas”); Lee Fleming, Santiago
Mingo & David Chen, Collaborative Brokerage, Generative Creativity, and Creative Suc-
cess, 52 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 443, 447 (2007) (showing, using data from utility patents, that an
inventor “is more likely to create new combinations if he or she brokers relations between
otherwise disconnected collaborators”); Jill E. Perry-Smith, Social Yet Creative: The Role
Of Social Relationships in Facilitating Individual Creativity, 49 ACAD. OF MGMT. J. 85,
96–98 (2006) (finding that individuals in a brokerage position are more creative than those
whose contacts remained inside a particular node, as rated by knowledgeable observers).
140. See, e.g., Klarreich, supra note 15, at 1; Mackenzie, supra note 19.
141. Phelps, Heidl & Wadhwa, supra note 127, at 1144 (“[T]o the extent increasing
centrality provides access to more diverse information, actors may need to expend greater
cognitive effort and resources to understand and utilize this information.”).
142. See, e.g., Laura G. Pedraza-Farin˜a, Understanding the Federal Circuit: An Expert
Community Approach, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 89, 115 (2015) (collecting sources on the
sociology of expertise and the importance of “learning by doing”).
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to both codified and tacit knowledge from more than two or three dispa-
rate communities of practice.143 These limitations are of course magnified
in the context of complex problems that require understanding and em-
beddedness in not just two but three or more disciplines. Understanding
these two limitations has shifted the unit of analysis in social network
studies from the work of individuals to that of teams—which is the focus
of the next subsection.144
B. WHERE DO GOOD IDEAS COME FROM? STRUCTURAL FOLDS
AND TEAM CREATIVITY
Until recently, social network research on team creativity and success
was split along two research traditions. One tradition emphasized the im-
portance of strong ties among team members (such as the strong ties that
connect members of each community of practice depicted in Figures 1
and 2). Strong ties among team members were hypothesized to lead to
team cohesion and to foster the development of a common research cul-
ture and a set of social norms, which in turn led to higher level of trust
among team members. Theories of how cohesive groups facilitate innova-
tion emphasize the crucial role of trust in fostering the disclosure and
acceptance of new ideas without fears of free riding or shirking.145 Dense
ties among group members are also thought to lower coordination
costs.146 On the other hand, another research tradition emphasizes the
importance of diversity over strong ties.147 Team diversity is predicted to
increase team performance by bridging structural holes thus fostering the
migration and recombination of ideas, methodologies, and resources
from different communities of practice.
Trust and diversity, however, often work in opposite directions—trust
increases as background diversity decreases.148 Teams whose members
belong to the same research tradition—that use the same research tools
and prioritize similar research questions—will enjoy higher levels of trust
than teams whose members have diverse expert backgrounds. But exces-
143. See, e.g., id. at 114 (describing studies on the role of tacit knowledge in expert
communities); see also Lee, supra note 111, at 1523–29 (collecting sources on studies on
tacit knowledge).
144. See, e.g., Mary L. Disis & John T. Slattery, The Road We Must Take: Multidiscipli-
nary Team Science, 2 SCI. TRANS. MED. 1 (2010); Stephen M. Fiore, Interdisciplinarity as
Teamwork - How the Science of Teams Can Inform Team Science, 39 SMALL GROUP RES.
251, 251–77 (2008); Stefan Wuchty, Benjamin F. Jones & Brian Uzzi, The Increasing Domi-
nance of Teams in Production of Knowledge, 316 SCIENCE 1036, 1036–38 (2007).
145. See, e.g., Lee Fleming, Charles King III & Adam I. Juda, Small Worlds and Re-
gional Innovation, 18 ORG. SCI. 938, 940–41 (2007); Brian Uzzi & Jarrett Spiro, Collabora-
tion and Creativity: The Small Worlds Problem, 111 AM. J. SOC. 447, 462–63 (2005).
146. See, e.g., Brian Uzzi, Social Structure and Competition in Inter-Firm Networks: The
Paradox of Embeddedness, 42 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 35, 48–49 (1997).
147. See, e.g., Vedres & Stark, supra note 29, at 1154 (“[B]usiness groups might elect to
forgo high density within the group in favor of maintaining more weak ties to firms outside
the group. Such a strategy of sacrificing density for diversity economizes network resources
by reducing the number of redundant ties.”).
148. See, e.g., FRANCESCO RAMELLA, SOCIOLOGY OF ECONOMIC INNOVATION 135–37
(2016) (summarizing research on trust and diversity in teams).
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sive cohesion in such teams hinders “the circulation of non-redundant
knowledge and the production of original ideas, and instead favors group
conformity.”149 The bridging ties of diverse teams avoid this problem by
ensuring that non-redundant, complementary knowledge is available to
the team. At the same time, diverse teams are less likely than homogene-
ous ones to enjoy high levels of trust because membership in different
research traditions—with their accompanying different research tools and
priorities—is predicted to create communication and coordination diffi-
culties. As Balazs Vedres and David Stark put it: “Brokerage/connectivity
provides access to ideas and information but in itself lacks the means for
implementation. Closure/cohesion provides the means of coordination
but lacks diversity for discovery.”150 Cohesive groups thus have an “idea
problem,”151 while brokered communities have an “action [or coordina-
tion] problem.”152
A recent, third line of research aims to reconcile these two research
traditions by emphasizing that “innovation involves a combination of
close familiarity and diversity.”153 In an influential series of papers,
Mathijs de Vaan, David Stark, and Balazs Vedres criticize and build upon
the concept of structural holes and brokerage.154 The authors emphasize
that idea or information migration across communities of practice
(through brokerage) is often insufficient to generate breakthrough inno-
vations.155 De Vaan, Stark and Vedres’s critique of Burt’s concept of bro-
kerage in many ways mirrors my own critique of market failure models of
innovation for assuming that ideas are simply “out there,” exogenous to
relevant economic analyses of innovation.156 The authors criticize Burt
for reducing idea generation to idea migration from one community to
another, but failing to engage with how new, unusual recombinations (or
ideas) arise in the first place.157 As the authors argue: “Instead of import-
ing ideas or information, the challenge is to generate knowledge.”158 To
do so, it is not enough for different communities to be in “long-distance
149. Id. at 137.
150. Vedres & Stark, supra note 29, at 1154.
151. Vedres & Stark, supra note 29, at 1154.
152. Vedres & Stark, supra note 29, at 1154.
153. Vedres & Stark, supra note 29, at 1155.
154. Mathijs de Vaan, Balazs Vedres & David Stark, Game Changer: The Topology of
Creativity, 120 AM. J. SOC. 1144 (2015); Vedres & Stark, supra note 29.
155. Vedres & Stark, supra note 29, at 1151 (“Whereas this brokerage-plus-closure per-
spective sees innovation as importing and implementing ideas, we offer an alternative con-
ception of entrepreneurship as recombination.”).
156. Vedres & Stark, supra note 29, at 1151 (“In our view, truly innovative ideas—in
the first instance, a fresh conceptualization of the problem itself—are not free-floating
outside the group.”).
157. De Vaan, Vedres & Stark, supra note 154, at 1151–52 (“Whereas the transmission
model of networks refers to how ideas flow, structural folding refers to how ideas are gener-
ated. In the former view, networks function as a kind of transportation system, moving
information from one social location to another, transplanting the kernel of an idea to
organizationally more nourishing conditions. Structural folding, by contrast, is more of a
production process where new problems are conceptualized as new resources are identi-
fied.”) (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
158. Vedres & Stark, supra note 29, at 1151.
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contact [with] casual access” to information to encourage the smooth flow
of information among them (as is the case in brokerage).159 Rather, “gen-
erating new problems, new knowledge, and new capabilities (as opposed
to transferring already accepted ideas)”160 requires deep and frequent in-
teraction between groups with different cognitive repertoires. Such col-
laboration, however, is only possible through the interaction of groups
with both overlapping memberships and diverse cognitive styles and
backgrounds. This is the key contribution in de Vaan, Stark and Vedres’s
work: recognizing that teams containing multiple individuals who them-
selves belong to more than a single community of practice can generate
sufficient trust among group members to enable sustained collaboration
across very different research traditions. Overlapping membership of
multiple individuals in more than one group provides the glue (trust) that
can encourage the different communities of practice to work together de-
spite their diversity. Breakthrough innovation requires this type of “gen-
erative tension”—brought about by diversity and held in place by trust.161
De Vaan, Stark, and Vedres call this network structure a “structural
fold” between overlapping groups.162 To explain how “structural folds”
lead to innovation, the authors use a helpful linguistic analogy: imagine
you are speaking with someone who has the exact same knowledge base
as you. You would understand each other perfectly but would learn noth-
ing new. To gain knowledge, you need to speak with someone whose
knowledge base is sufficiently different from yours, but to understand
each other, you have to be willing to work through misunderstandings
and develop a new shared language. As the authors explain:
Structural folding matters because it does not simply facilitate a
translation from one code to another but fosters the emergence of
the primitive lexicon for new languages. That is, structural folding is
the agent space for developing creole. Working within communities
and sometimes acting in concert with others who are with them at
the overlap, the structural fold makes it possible to develop a rudi-
mentary language. Where cognitive distance is great, even a primi-
tive lexicon can be an opportune starting point for a truly creative
innovation. Together with trust, it can create a setting in which actors
can cope with ambiguity and the tensions of non-translatability.163
159. Vedres & Stark, supra note 29, at 1151.
160. Vedres & Stark, supra note 29, at 1158.
161. De Vaan, Vedres & Stark, supra note 154, at 1153 (“And the more distant the
groups within the team, the more trust matters in regards to the tension—not for eliminat-
ing it but for holding it in place until new kinds of creatively stylistic combinations can
emerge.”).
162. Infra Figure 4.
163. De Vaan, Vedres & Stark, supra note 154, at 1153.
406 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70
Figure 4: Structural Holes vs. Structural Folds
I have characterized the Kadison-Singer problem, and its successful so-
lution by a team of computer scientists, as an example of brokerage. Nev-
ertheless, the emerging collaboration between mathematicians and
computer scientists to understand the intricacies of both the different for-
mulations of the Kadison-Singer problem, as well as its full solution and
potential applications, also helps to illustrate the importance of structural
folding. Daniel Spielman, the computer scientist who led the team that
provided a solution to the problem, admitted he didn’t “understand really
the Kadison-Singer problem”164 as initially formulated in the language of
mathematical physics. On their end, mathematicians have similarly noted
that they “had a lot of trouble understanding how [the computer scien-
tists] solved [the Kadison Singer problem].”165 Current efforts to bring
mathematicians and computer scientists together around the Kadison-
Singer problem are akin to efforts to build a structural fold, creating the
space for a new shared language to emerge between these two groups.
C. PROBLEM FINDING AND PROBLEM FRAMING IN
BREAKTHROUGH INNOVATION
As de Vaan, Stark, and Vedres emphasize, a crucial step in idea genera-
tion—but one that is underappreciated in both patent law doctrine and
theory—is problem finding and problem framing.166 In fact, the impor-
tance of structural folds lies precisely in the ability of overlapping groups
to recombine their knowledge bases to both re-frame existing problems
and formulate new problems at the intersection of multiple communities
of practice.167 The importance of “problem finding” and “problem fram-
ing” to innovation was eloquently described by John Dewey, the founder
of the pragmatist school of philosophy, who criticized popular concep-
tions of innovation as analytical problem-solving. Instead, Dewey posited:
164. Daniel Spielman, The Solution of the Kadison-Singer Problem, TECHTALKS.TV,
http://techtalks.tv/talks/the-solution-of-the-kadison-singer-problem/59383 [https://perma
.cc/L6MJ-3S9J] (navigate to 1:22).
165. Klarreich, supra note 15.
166. De Vaan, Vedres & Stark, supra note 154, at 1154, 1186.
167. De Vaan, Vedres & Stark, supra note 154, at 1154, 1186.
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[I]t is artificial, so far as thinking is concerned, to start with a ready-
made problem, a problem made out of whole cloth or arising out of a
vacuum. In reality such a “problem” is simply an assigned task. There
is not at first a situation and a problem, much less just a problem and
no situation. There is a troubled, perplexed, trying situation, where
the difficulty is, as it were, spread throughout the entire situation,
infecting it as a whole. If we knew just what the difficulty was and
where it lay, the job of reflection would be much easier than it is. . . .
In fact, we know what the problem exactly is simultaneously with
finding a way out and getting it resolved.168
Dewey’s description of the “troubled, perplexed, trying situation”169
that often faces innovators can be best understood by reference to the
observation—made subsequently by several sociologists of innovation—
that often, the bottleneck (or “rate-limiting”170) step in a particular inno-
vation is finding and framing a problem to be solved. Once a problem is
defined, the steps to its solution frequently reveal themselves. Viewed in
this way, to think about innovation as beginning with an idea and ending
with product development is to overlook the most important steps that
lead to idea-generation: finding and framing the problem that a particular
idea is attempting to solve. Prioritizing problem-solving over problem-
finding overlooks a key question: how do communities of practice find
and define good problems to be solved?
Once again, the Kadison-Singer problem presents a good illustration of
the importance of both problem-finding and problem-framing. The for-
mulation of the Kadison-Singer problem itself (an example of “problem
finding”), carried out by two mathematicians who were deeply interested
in quantum physics, enabled the creation of an entire field of inquiry.171
Attempting to solve the Kadison-Singer problem gave rise to a myriad of
innovations, first in mathematics, and then in engineering and computer
science.172 In turn, the reformulation of the Kadison-Singer problem as a
computer science problem is an example of the importance of problem-
framing. By translating the mathematically-worded Kadison-Singer prob-
lem to the language of computer science (a sparsification problem about
168. JOHN DEWEY, ANALYSIS OF REFLECTIVE THINKING (1933), reprinted in 8 THE
LATER WORKS OF JOHN DEWEY 201 (Jo Ann Boydston et al. eds., 2008).
169. Id.
170. Throughout this article, I use the term “rate-limiting” step to denote the step in
innovation that is the slowest, and thus determinative of the overall speed with which inno-
vation happens. The term was used originally in chemistry, but innovation policy scholars
have begun to use it as applied to steps in the innovation process. See, e.g., Nancy S. Sung
& John E. Burris, Regulatory Science Innovation: A Rate-Limiting Step in Translation, 4
SCI. TRANS. MED. Sept. 5, 2012, at 1.
171. Klarreich, supra note 15, at 2–6.
172. See, e.g., Casazza & Tremain, supra note 14; Klarreich, supra note 15; Mackenzie,
supra note 19; Kadison-Singer Math Solution May Mean A Boost For Science 2.0, SCIENCE
2.0 BLOG (Jul. 12, 2014, 12:30 PM), http://www.science20.com/news_articles/kadisonsinger_
math_solution_may_mean_a_boost_for_science_20-140452 [https://perma.cc/HFE4-
UVUJ]; Holly Lauridsen, Effort to Model Facebook Yields Key to Famous Math Problem
(and a Prize), YALE NEWS (July 7, 2014), http://news.yale.edu/2014/07/07/effort-model-face
book-yields-key-famous-math-problem-and-prize [https://perma.cc/E9BY-VF7J].
408 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70
connections in a network), Daniel Spielman made the problem amenable
to analysis by a completely different set of tools than what mathemati-
cians and engineers had employed until then.173 Note how the framing of
the Kadison-Singer problem in the language of network sparsification it-
self suggested a solution—or at the very least suggested a set of tools and
steps that should be used to address it.174 In fact, once he formulated the
problem in network sparsification terms, Spielman felt confident he could
solve it relatively quickly because this formulation “seemed so natural, so
central to the kinds of things [he thought] about.”175
Problem-framing, as I use the term in this Article, is closely related to
problem-finding. To find a problem involves “framing” a puzzle about the
world in a way that can be analytically tackled. I use problem-finding to
denote the first “formulation” or “framing” of such a puzzle or question
to be solved, while I reserve the term “problem-framing” to reformula-
tions of the equivalent problem in a language that can be understood by
additional communities of practice. As the Kadison-Singer problem illus-
trates, often truly innovative ideas begin with “a fresh conceptualization
of the problem itself.”176
The concept of structural folds provides a way to think about how new
problems are identified and then successively re-framed. It is precisely
through the friction or “generative tension” of multiple communities with
diverse cognitive repertoires that come together at structural folds that
new problems are found.177 Sociologists Richard Lester and Michael Pi-
ore have called the process of finding a new problem “interpretation” (as
opposed to the “analysis” that takes place to solve an already well-de-
fined problem).178 Much like de Vaan, Stark, and Vedres, Lester and Pi-
ore compare the process of problem finding to what takes place when two
different linguistic communities first meet and attempt to understand
each other.179 In their study of innovation in three different industries—
blue jeans, cellular telephones, and medical devices—Lester and Piore
conclude: “The way that . . . problems came to be identified and clarified
to the point where a solution could be discussed was through conversa-
tions among people from different backgrounds and with different per-
spectives . . . . [W]hat emerges from these conversations, if they are
sustained, is something very much a language community. New products
emerge out of that community.”180 Sustaining these conversations in the
173. See Klarreich, supra note 15, at 1.
174. Klarreich, supra note 15, at 1.
175. Klarreich, supra note 15, at 1.
176. Vedres & Stark, supra note 29, at 1151.
177. See DAVID STARK, THE SENSE OF DISSONANCE 109 (2009) (arguing that while
“[w]ell-defined problems can be solved with the firm’s accumulated knowledge, . . . the real
challenge of innovation is less to solve already identified problems than to anticipate and
generate new problems”).
178. RICHARD LESTER & MICHAEL PIORE, INNOVATION: THE MISSING DIMENSION 53
(2006).
179. Id. at 53–54.
180. Id. at 10–11, 51. Lester and Piore describe how three key technologies emerged
from boundary-crossing innovation: “Cellular telephones are the marriage of the radio and
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face of initial misunderstandings and ambiguities created the necessary
“generative tension”—using de Vaan, Stark, and Vedres’ terminology—
that led to breakthrough innovation.181
Yet, problem finding is fraught with obstacles arising from the difficulty
of communicating or translating knowledge across communities of prac-
tice—in other words, arising from the very information-flow difficulties
inherent in the architecture of knowledge space and described in detail
earlier in this Part.182 Thus, investigating the origin of good ideas brings
us back full circle to incorrect assumptions about the free flow of infor-
mation. It is only by understanding the social failures that lead to the
breakdown in cooperation across communities (or that prevent coopera-
tion from arising in the first place) that we can begin to develop policy
initiatives to optimize innovation outcomes.
Summary
Harnessing studies in the sociology of networks, this Part described
how the “lumpy” structure of knowledge networks—characterized by
communities of practice with dense social relationships separated by
structural holes—prevents the free flow of potentially complementary in-
formation across community lines. Hurdles to information flow—or more
precisely to information exchange, recombination, and reformulation—
across structural holes prevent or delay the emergence of breakthrough
innovation. This is because breakthrough ideas, spurred by the identifica-
tion and framing of new problems, emerge at structural folds: sites in the
knowledge network where cognitively distant communities of practice in-
teract with each other.
Disrupting the assumptions made in market failure models of innova-
tion that information flows freely across the knowledge space, and that a
ready set of problems to be solved is “out there,” reveals the importance
of social structures for both information flow and its productive recombi-
nation. Therefore, understanding structural holes, as well as how they
arise and are maintained, is a crucial task in innovation policy. The next
Part undertakes this task through three case studies in three different in-
dustries—computer science and mathematics, public health, and medical
research. The case studies serve two functions: first, they make more con-
the telephone; fashion jeans bring together traditional workmen’s clothing and laundry
technology borrowed from hospitals and hotels; medical devices draw on both basic life
sciences and clinical practice. Without integration across the borders separating these dif-
ferent fields, there would have been no new products at all.” Id. at 14–15.
181. Id. at 54 (describing how “[t]he cell phone emerged in the space created by the
ambiguity about whether the product was a radio or a telephone; by playing with that
ambiguity, the device became something that was different from either of them”).
182. See supra Part II.A. See also Lester & Piore, supra note 178, at 33 (describing the
reluctance of managers and engineers to work across boundaries: “For all the talk about
integration across boundaries in the literature and in our interviews, our respondents were
much more comfortable with—and much better at talking about—a world in which bound-
aries were well defined and well policed than a world in which communication was free
and open.”).
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crete the abstract propositions of network studies, illustrating the ubiq-
uity of social barriers to innovation; second, they contribute to network
research itself by proposing a taxonomy of what I term “social network
failures”—characteristics of the social network fabric that prevent fruitful
transmission and recombination of ideas through structural folds by keep-
ing structural holes in place.
Understanding, through specific case studies, how different barriers to
information flow and problem-finding/framing emerge helps identify ar-
eas where patent law doctrine is out of step with how scientific and tech-
nical research actually takes place in the laboratory, and provides a guide
to better align patent doctrine with the realities of scientific and technical
research. I analyze these implications for patent doctrine in Part IV.
More broadly, understanding why and how productive structural folds
fail to form or fail to be maintained is as important to the design of inno-
vation law and policy as is understanding why and how markets fail to
optimally sustain innovation. I take up these implications in Part VI.
III. SOCIAL NETWORK FAILURES IN INNOVATION:
THREE CASE STUDIES
This Part presents three case studies that illustrate the importance of
social structure for both information flow and its productive recombina-
tion in a variety of industries. These examples provide concrete evidence
that, rather than flow freely, information spreads very unevenly across
communities of practice—due to a variety of social barriers. They also
show how problem-finding and problem-framing are key rate-limiting
steps in the formulation of breakthrough ideas—steps that deserve more
attention from a law and policy perspective. Through these case studies, I
develop a taxonomy of social network failures. The taxonomy (Figure 5)
complements traditional market failure analyses of innovation long used
by law and economics scholars (and depicted in Figure 1) by identifying
specific social barriers to innovation that can guide new law and policy
interventions.
A. SOCIAL NETWORK FAILURES IN PUBLIC HEALTH: LIGHT
CIGARETTES AND CANCER
This first case study concerns a social network failure in public health
resulting in a ten-year delay in the discovery that smoking low-tar or
“light” cigarettes was just as carcinogenic as smoking regular cigarettes.
Following the widespread recognition of smoking as the leading cause of
lung cancer in the late 1960s, tobacco companies began focusing their ef-
forts on manufacturing “light” cigarettes.183 Public health experts initially
believed that light cigarettes would decrease cancer risk—based on the
183. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC., AND WELFARE, PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE
PUBLICATION NO. 1103, SMOKING AND HEALTH: REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
TO THE SURGEON GENERAL OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE (1964).
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plausible assumption that “cigarettes that delivered less tar to smokers
would be likely to produce less cancer as well.”184 Consumption of light
cigarettes increased dramatically in the 1970s and 80s, driven by consum-
ers’ informed belief that light cigarettes were a much safer choice than
unfiltered ones.185
It is now widely accepted, however, that light cigarettes are no less car-
cinogenic than regular cigarettes, and can even lead to particularly ag-
gressive forms of cancer.186 Empirical data required to reach this
conclusion, however, was publicly available187 a full decade before public
health researchers actually made this important finding.188 But crucial
empirical data, while nominally public as published research papers, was
distributed across research communities that did not collaborate or com-
municate with each other and were unaware of each other’s findings —
despite all being concerned with studying the same topic: cancer and
smoking.189 In fact, the three different research communities in ques-
tion—epidemiologists, smoking laboratories, and chemists focusing on
cigarette reverse engineering—had received over US$200 million of fund-
ing from the National Cancer Institute (NCI) to conduct research on the
effects of cigarette smoking.
Epidemiologists doing large population studies had identified a more
aggressive form of lung cancer, whose incidence was rising.190 The rates
of this more aggressive lung cancer began to rise shortly after the intro-
duction of light cigarettes in the market, but epidemiologists did not
make the connection between light cigarette smoking and this more ag-
gressive form of lung cancer.191 At around the same time, smoking labo-
184. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH SMOKING
CIGARETTES WITH LOW MACHINE-MEASURED YIELDS OF TAR AND NICOTINE 1–2 (2001)
(“Faced with the continuing exposure of large numbers of smokers to the cancer-causing
substances in tobacco smoke, public health authorities made the valid conclusion that ciga-
rettes that delivered less tar to smokers would be likely to produce less cancer as well, and
the effort to produce and market low-tar cigarettes began to gather momentum.”) (citation
omitted).
185. Id. at 197 (“To a considerable extent, smokers choose Light and Ultra-Light
brands because they think that these cigarettes are not as harmful and cause fewer health
problems.”).
186. Id. at 146.
187. I focus here on public data available to public health researchers. There are credi-
ble reports that tobacco companies themselves knew of the negative effects of low-tar ciga-
rettes before data necessary to reach that conclusion was publicly available. See, e.g., STAFF
OF H.R. COMM. ON GOV’T REFORM, 108TH CONG., THE LESSONS OF “LIGHT” AND “LOW
TAR” CIGARETTES: WITHOUT EFFECTIVE REGULATION, “REDUCED RISK” TOBACCO
PRODUCTS THREATEN THE PUBLIC HEALTH ii (Comm. Print 2003) (“Even as their adver-
tisements promoted ‘light’ and ‘low tar’ cigarettes as better for health, tobacco companies
knew that smokers generally received the same amount of nicotine and other toxins from
these products as from their regular cigarettes.”).
188. See, e.g., Noshir Contractor, Collaborative Research: Social Networking Tools to
Enable Collaboration in the Tobacco Surveillance, Epidemiology, and Evaluation Network
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ratories studying the behavior of smokers who switched to light cigarettes
discovered that this population compensated for the lower levels of tar
and nicotine in light cigarettes by inhaling more deeply and smoking
more cigarettes per day.192 As a result, and despite reduced machine-
measured tar yields for light cigarettes, smokers who switched to light
cigarettes “preserve[d] their moment-to-moment and daily intake of nico-
tine.”193 Finally, cigarette reverse engineering laboratories identified new
additives in light cigarettes with unknown carcinogenic properties.194
These laboratories, however, remained unaware of the new type of lung
cancer identified through epidemiological research, and thus did not link
its rising incidence to these potential carcinogens in light cigarettes.195
It was not until a researcher at the University of California San Fran-
cisco, Neal Benowitz, came across research in all three areas that a prom-
ising hypothesis could be formulated—linking the new potentially
carcinogenic additives in low-tar cigarettes and the behavior of light ciga-
rette smokers with the new, more aggressive type of lung cancer.196 Be-
nowitz convinced the NCI to fund research to test this hypothesis. In six
months, a team of researchers from all three fields funded by the NCI
showed this hypothesis to be correct—and ten years of research was fi-
nally connected.197
This case study quite strikingly illustrates how important information to
address a public health concern, which was located “out there” in the
public domain, free of legal encumberments, and accessible to anyone
who wanted to find it, nevertheless was not in fact accessed or produc-
tively recombined by relevant actors for a ten-year period. To the con-
trary, when knowledge resources reside in different communities of
practice that are separated by a structural hole, making information
“free” or “open” is often insufficient to solve complex problems requiring
their combined community expertise. The barrier to information recom-
bination in this case was neither private control of information, nor high
access costs—at least not in the sense that “access costs” are conceptual-
ized in the open source literature as a function of technological accessibil-
192. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 184, at 3.
193. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 184, at 2.
194. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 184, at 160. Smoking labora-
tories had also found that people who smoke light cigarettes can inhale up to five times as
much smoke as those who smoke regular cigarettes, but these laboratories were also una-
ware of the epidemiological findings. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note
184, at 18–19.
195. See Contractor, supra note 188.
196. University of California, San Francisco, Neal Benowitz, MD, UCSF PROFILES,
http://profiles.ucsf.edu/neal.benowitz#toc-id2 [https://perma.cc/76GB-LPKQ]; see U.S.
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 184, at 44–45, 47.
197. See Melinda T. Willis, Light Cigarettes Are Not Safer, ABC NEWS (“This report is
one that has brought together scientists of various disciplines and has concluded that there
are significant health risks from switching to low-tar, light cigarettes”) (quoting Scott Leis-
chow, chief of the National Cancer Institute Tobacco Control Research Branch), http://
abcnews.go.com/Health/story?id=117102 [https://perma.cc/6RPF-T88P] (last visited Mar.
23, 2017).
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ity and cost.198 Rather the lack of social and cognitive ties between these
three communities was responsible for the ten-year delay.199
This first type of social barrier to knowledge recombination flows di-
rectly from Burt’s studies on structural holes in the information space:
how a community member searches for information and prioritizes infor-
mation found is deeply informed by whom she knows (a social tie) and
what those connections know (a cognitive tie).200 Epidemiologists were
simply not keeping up to date with research in cigarette reverse engineer-
ing laboratories, neither did they interact routinely with members of that
community. Similarly, chemists in reverse engineering laboratories did
not routinely read epidemiological research, nor were they in regular con-
tact with epidemiologists working on cancer. Both groups could, how-
ever, understand each other’s research papers and results.
It was precisely the recognition of this deficit through NCI’s experience
with light cigarettes and cancer research that led to the creation of the
Tobacco Informatics Grid (TobIG)—to enable collaboration within the
Tobacco Surveillance, Epidemiology, and Evaluation Network
(TSEEN).201 One way to think about TobIG is as a policy solution aimed
at creating the infrastructure to facilitate deeper interactions and connec-
tions among communities separated by a structural hole. As we shall see
in Part V, creating knowledge infrastructures is one policy initiative that
can help bridge structural holes, especially when the social barrier at issue
is simply a lack of social and cognitive ties between communities.
This case study also provides further evidence of the importance of
problem-finding in innovation. Much like Gil Kalai’s role in solving the
Kadison-Singer problem, Benowitz acted as a “broker” or “boundary-
spanner” between these disconnected communities. In other words, Be-
nowitz filled a structural hole that divided the information space occupied
by these three communities of practice. Note how Benowitz’s role, how-
ever, was not simply one of migrating information from one community
to another. His position in a structural hole, with access to knowledge
from the three disconnected communities, allowed him to formulate a
novel hypothesis about light cigarette smoking. In the language I have
employed in this Article, Benowitz found a problem—why did cancer
rates for an aggressive form of lung cancer increase following the intro-
duction of light cigarettes to the market?—that only the combined exper-
tise of all three communities could answer. Much like the Kadison-Singer
problem, however, the rate-limiting step was problem-finding and fram-
ing. Once the problem was identified and framed, a solution emerged
quite rapidly.
198. See supra Part I.A.
199. See Figure 5.
200. See supra Part II.A.
201. See, e.g., Scott J. Leischow, Allan Best, William M. Trochim, Pamela I. Clark,
Richard S. Gallagher, Stephen E. Marcus & Eva Matthews, Systems Thinking to Improve
the Public’s Health, 35 AM. J. PREV. MED. S196, S199 (2008).
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B. SOCIAL NETWORK FAILURES IN MATHEMATICS/COMPUTER
SCIENCE: THE KADISON-SINGER PROBLEM
A precise description of the Kadison-Singer problem, as a review arti-
cle has remarked, “almost defies translation into simple English.”202 But I
have chosen it as a case study of social network failures in innovation
because the path to its solution provides a powerful illustration of three
important points. First, there are many sub-communities of practice
within any given technological area of inquiry that—contrary to what
those outside that technological area may believe—are separated by
structural holes. In other words, much like the communities involved in
tobacco research and described in the preceding section, these sub-com-
munities lack socio-cognitive ties. As a consequence, they do not routinely
communicate with each other and are often unaware of each other’s re-
search results. Second, in some cases, research communities within a par-
ticular technological area cannot even interpret and evaluate each other’s
research results: they are separated by great cognitive distances that can
prevent fruitful idea recombination.203 Third, it is precisely because of the
barriers generated by cognitive distance that problem framing in a lan-
guage that can be understood by multiple communities is often a rate-
limiting step in complex innovation. In turn, problem-framing frequently
requires the creation of cross-cutting teams (or structural folds) that can
develop a creole to jointly frame problems at their intersection.
To illustrate these three points, the next paragraphs provide a fuller
description of the Kadison-Singer problem and efforts to address it by
multiple communities of practice both within and outside the disciplinary
field of mathematics. The first relevant community of practice implicated
in the Kadison-Singer problem is that of quantum physics.204 The prob-
lem has its roots in Heisenberg’s famous uncertainty principle, which
states that it is impossible to simultaneously measure in an experiment
the position and momentum of a particle.205 Heisenberg’s uncertainty
principle gives rise to an experimental conundrum: if position and mo-
mentum cannot be simultaneously measured, how do we describe the
unique state of a particle (or of a system with multiple particles) in a way
that can be experimentally verified?206 In 1930 physicist Paul Dirac pos-
tulated that “even if there is this uncertainty principle, there is always a
way to get around it,”207 so that “every physical system can be [fully]
described in terms of quantities which can be measured simultane-
ously.”208 Richard Kadison and Isadore Singer, two mathematicians,
wanted to figure out if there was a rigorous mathematical proof for
202. Mackenzie, supra note 19.
203. Infra Figure 5.
204. Mackenzie, supra note 19; see also Klarreich, supra note 15, at 2–6.
205. For a concise explanation of the Kadison-Singer problem, see Srivastava, supra
note 16 (video tutorial).
206. Srivastava, supra note 16, at 00:15.
207. Srivastava, supra note 16, at 00:40.
208. Srivastava, supra note 16, at 00:28.
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Dirac’s claim.209 In the words that I used to describe the problem in the
introduction: is there mathematical proof that “every physical system can
be completely described by quantities which can be measured simultane-
ously”?210 Kadison and Singer thought the answer was no—but could not
arrive at a mathematical proof.211 (It turns out that the answer as shown
by Marcus, Spielman, and Srivastava is “yes.”).212 The applications of
solving Kadison-Singer are far-reaching, including improving signal-
processing for any engineering applications and an improved ability to
model interactions among groups within complex networks.213
How the Kadison-Singer problem made its way from its original formu-
lation in 1959 in the operator algebra community214 to other fields within
mathematics, then engineering, and finally computer science, is a fasci-
nating study in idea diffusion, reframing, and recombination—and in the
social barriers that work against this process. In the words of a reviewer,
“[i]n its original formulation, the problem was of great interest to special-
ists in operator algebras, but rather inaccessible to anyone else.”215 But in
the 1970s, different versions (or “framings”) of the Kadison-Singer prob-
lem began to emerge in other mathematical subfields, under different
names: the “Paving conjecture,”216 the “Bourgain-Tzafriri conjecture,”217
the “Feichtinger conjecture.”218 The mathematicians who formulated
these different versions, however, “were not always aware of each other”
or of the Kadison-Singer formulation itself.219
It wasn’t until 2006 that an applied mathematician and engineer, Peter
Casazza, with three other mathematicians, “collected” all of these mathe-
matical formulations in a single article. Casazza explained:
We didn’t start out looking for equivalent versions of Kadison-
Singer. . . . We were actually trying to solve the problem, and kept
moving to different areas of research [in mathematics and engineer-
ing] hoping that one of them had deep enough results to handle the
problem. It was a fluke that each time we entered a new area of
research, this was equivalent to their most famous unsolved
problem.220
The evolution of the Kadison-Singer problem up to this point illus-
trates the existence of two distinct types of social barriers to the flow of
information and its productive recombination, across subcommunities in
209. Srivastava, supra note 16, at 00:49.
210. Srivastava, supra note 16, at 00:28.
211. Srivastava, supra note 16, at 00:49.
212. Srivastava, supra note 16, at 01:10, 01:40.
213. See, e.g., Casazza & Tremain, supra note 14, at 1; Kadison-Singer Math Solution
May Mean A Boost For Science 2.0, supra note 172, at 1–2; Klarreich, supra note 15, at 5;
Lauridsen, supra note 172; Mackenzie, supra note 19.
214. This community encompasses the (smaller) C* algebra community.
215. Mackenzie, supra note 19.
216. Mackenzie, supra note 19.
217. Mackenzie, supra note 19.
218. Mackenzie, supra note 19.
219. Mackenzie, supra note 19.
220. Mackenzie, supra note 19; see also Casazza & Tremain, supra note 14.
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mathematics. First, much like the three communities involved in tobacco
and cancer research, different mathematics communities lacked socio-
cognitive ties. Thus, C* algebra community members did not routinely
interact with members of, for example, complex analysis or graph theory
communities (social ties) and were thus unaware of what each other were
working on (cognitive ties). But there was a second barrier that divided
these communities: they did not possess the background knowledge nec-
essary to understand each other’s research results or, in the language that
I use in this Article, they were separated by large cognitive distances.221
Taken together, these two factors explain the initial isolation of the
Kadison-Singer problem in the C* algebra community and the subse-
quent independent re-framing of the problem in different community
languages.
Much like Neal Benowitz in the case of tobacco research, Peter
Casazza and Janet Tremain acted as brokers. Their journal article con-
necting together multiple problems in different mathematical and engi-
neering fields to the Kadison-Singer problem is an example of the power
of problem-framing in pointing the way to a solution.222 Casazza and
Tremain’s article identified one particular framing of the Kadison-Singer
problem in the language of linear algebra matrices that was “simpler to
state.”223 The article served as a nexus that connected multiple under-
standings of the problem. As an analyst has described it, emphasizing the
importance of problem framing: “almost imperceptibly, . . . the river was
approaching its destination—the conjecture was becoming simpler to
state, if not to prove.”224 It turns out that once the correct framing was
found, a solution came relatively rapidly.
The solution to the Kadison-Singer problem did not emerge from any
of these mathematical subcommunities, however. It emerged out of work
on complex online networks. Daniel Spielman’s laboratory—which ulti-
mately provided the final mathematical proof that the answer to the
Kadison-Singer problem was “yes”—focused on modelling “complex on-
line communities like Facebook, hoping to gain insight into how they
form and interact.”225 In essence, Spielman’s research was focused on
whether any given dense graph (or network, such as Facebook) could be
reduced to an equivalent but sparser (and thus simpler) graph.226 Replac-
ing dense networks with their sparse equivalents makes it much easier to
run applications or perform operation on the dense network platform. In
technical terms, this area of research is called “graph sparsification.”227
It turns out that the Kadison-Singer problem about whether physical
systems can be fully described only through quantities that can be mea-
221. Infra Figure 5.
222. See Casazza & Tremain, supra note 14, at 4.
223. Mackenzie, supra note 19.
224. Mackenzie, supra note 19 (emphasis added).
225. Lauridsen, supra note 172.
226. See Srivastava, supra note 16.
227. Mackenzie, supra note 19.
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sured simultaneously, and the computer science question of whether any
complex network can be sparsified into a simpler one, can be framed as
the same question about matrices and linear algebra. It was mathemati-
cian Gil Kalai who first made this connection when discussing Spielman’s
research in sparsification—another instance of brokerage, this time be-
tween the operator algebra community and computer science.228 Once
these two problems were connected and framed as addressing the same
question, Spielman’s laboratory was able to provide a proof in a relatively
short period of time (five years) using computer simulation tools that the
mathematics community is still assimilating.229 The proof has also
brought together groups of computer scientists and mathematicians to de-
velop a shared language to address the myriad implications of solving the
Kadison-Singer problem—in effect seeking to create a structural fold
where new recombinations can take place.230
The migration of the Kadison-Singer problem from the mathematics
community to that of computer science further demonstrate the crucial,
rate-limiting step of problem framing in innovation. It also shows how
large cognitive distances between two or more communities of practice
can delay the solution of problems that lie at their intersection. In this
case, Spielman himself has professed to not understanding the original
Kadison-Singer framing of the problem. On their end, several mathemati-
cians have called Marcus, Spielman and Srivastava’s proof “magical,” and
are still struggling to understand the tools that this team of computer
scientists used to solve the Kadison-Singer problem.231
C. SOCIAL NETWORK FAILURES IN MEDICAL CARE: FERTILITY
IN CANCER PATIENTS
This final case study emerges from interviews that I conducted with
members of the Oncofertility consortium—an interdisciplinary team of
oncologists, endocrinologists, cryobiologists and engineers researching
fertility preservation techniques for young cancer patients.232 This case
study is part of a long-term, broader comparative project to study the
228. Klarreich, supra note 15.
229. Klarreich, supra note 15.
230. See Klarreich, supra note 15.
231. See, e.g., Klarreich, supra note 15 (“We don’t have the manual for this magic tool
yet.” (quoting mathematician Terence Tao)); Orr Shalit, Another One Bites the Dust (Actu-
ally Many of Them), NONCOMMUTATIVE ANALYSIS (June 20, 2013), https://noncommuta-
tiveanalysis.wordpress.com/2013/06/20/another-one-bites-the-dust-actually-many-of-them
[https://perma.cc/S5DV-LZXK] (“[T]he proof looks completely magical to me.”). In his
blog, Shalitt also discussed the difficulties, from a mathematician’s perspective, of fully
understanding the techniques used by Marcus, Spielman, and Srivastava: “Contrary to
what I hopefully wrote above, there is no chance I will be able to do something with their
techniques. There is a very big difference between somehow following a proof, and actually
understanding how the techniques work and where to apply them.” Id.
232. Interdisciplinary Research Program Consortia, NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH (June 25,
2014), https://commonfund.nih.gov/Interdisciplinary/consortia [https://perma.cc/BJ9U-
JSSK]; The Oncofertility Consortium: Fertility Preservation for Women, NAT’L INSTS. OF
HEALTH (June 25, 2014), https://commonfund.nih.gov/Interdisciplinary/consortia/oncofer
[https://perma.cc/RE98-NTP4].
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formation and functioning of interdisciplinary teams across different
technological domains.233 For the purpose of this Article, this case study
helps illustrate and identify a separate set of social barriers to productive
problem-finding and information-recombination across community
boundaries: different ways of evaluating the worth of research projects,
research tools, and research results—what I call different evaluative
frames. As was the case in the previous two case studies, interviews with
Oncofertility consortium members also show that problem-finding and
problem-framing at the intersection of multiple communities to be a key
step in the generation of ideas for complex innovation.
The Oncofertility consortium was funded as part of a National Insti-
tutes of Health (NIH) Roadmap Initiative.234 This initiative launched in
2003 with the goal of identifying (and funding) potentially transformative
research requiring collaboration and coordination across NIH institutes
and across traditional scientific disciplines.235 The goal of the Oncofer-
tility consortium was to address the unmet need of cancer survivors (and
in particular female survivors) for fertility preservation options at the
time of diagnosis. As cancer treatments have become more sophisticated
and effective, the number of cancer survivors—and in particular child-
hood cancer survivors—has increased worldwide.236 But research on the
impact of cancer therapeutics on male and female fertility, as well as re-
search on fertility preservation techniques for females, has lagged behind.
So has the availability of fertility services for newly diagnosed cancer pa-
tients: at the time of the grant, the infertility industry was structured to
deal exclusively with planned in-vitro fertilizations but not equipped to
offer emergency procedures. And despite the rising numbers of patients
living cancer-free, treating oncologists seldom discussed the treatment’s
effect on fertility, or options for fertility preservation, with their pa-
tients.237 This was the case despite studies showing that cancer patients
rank fears of losing their fertility second only to those of facing death.238
233. For a full description of the methodology used in this case study and a more de-
tailed account of the Oncofertility consortium, see Laura G. Pedraza-Farin˜a, Constructing
Interdisciplinary Collaboration: The Oncofertility Consortium as an Emerging Knowledge
Commons, in GOVERNING MEDICAL KNOWLEDGE COMMONS (Brett Frischmann, Michael
Madison & Katherine Strandburg, eds., forthcoming 2017, Cambridge Univ. Press).
234. Elias A. Zerhouni, US Biomedical Research: Basic, Translational, and Clinical Sci-
ences, 294 JAMA 1352, 1355 (2005).
235. Elias A. Zerhouni, The NIH Roadmap, 302 SCIENCE 63, 63 (2003).
236. NAT’L CANCER INST., SEER CANCER STATISTICS REVIEW, 1997–1999 11–12
(L.A.G. Reis et al. eds., 2002), https://seer.cancer.gov/archive/csr/1973_1999/overview.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8HGD-EXN8].
237. Teresa K. Woodruff, The Emergence of a New Interdiscipline: Oncofertility, in
ONCOFERTILITY: FERTILITY PRESERVATION FOR CANCER SURVIVORS 3, 7 (Teresa K.
Woodruff & Karrie Ann Snyder, eds., 2007).
238. See Carrie L. Nieman, Karen E. Kinahan, Susan E. Yount, Sarah K. Rosenbloom,
Kathleen J. Yost, Elizabeth A. Hahn, Timothy Volpe, Kimberley J. Dilley, Laurie Zoloth
& Teresa K. Woodruff, Fertility Preservation and Adolescent Cancer Patients: Lessons from
Adult Survivors of Childhood Cancer and Their Parents, 138 CANCER TREAT RES. 201, 205
(2007).
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As a result, many cancer survivors were confronted with a second devas-
tating diagnosis: that of infertility resulting from their cancer treatments.
One fundamental reason for this disconnect between the needs of can-
cer patients and research and treatment priorities of the research and
medical community that emerged from my interviews was the lack of
communication and collaboration between oncologists and reproductive
endocrinologists. The oncofertility consortium sought to remedy these
“information, data, and option gaps”239 and “serve as an authoritative
voice for research, clinical practice, and training at the intersection of on-
cology, pediatrics, reproductive science and medicine, biomechanics, ma-
terial science, mathematics, social science, bioethics, religion, policy
research, reproductive health law, cognitive and learning science in a new
discipline called oncofertility.”240
One particular barrier to collaboration between oncologists and en-
docrinologists represents a common thread across all interviewees: the
different evaluative frames in these two communities to judge the worth of
a particular line of research or treatment. These different ways of evaluat-
ing the worth of a research project or of research results led to different
research priorities and practice styles that kept the two communities from
working together and from working on problems at the intersection of
both fields. Importantly, this barrier to collaboration was perpetuated by
organizational structures, such as professional associations, university and
medical school departments, and grant review boards.241
Oncologists’ focus on understanding the mechanisms of cell prolifera-
tion and cell death (the hallmarks of cancer), and on improving survival
rates, meant that there was scant research into the effects of cancer chem-
otherapeutic agents on fertility.242 Oncology research prioritized identifi-
cation of cellular proliferation pathways and new genes that could
constitute potential therapeutic targets.243 Research focusing on the ef-
fect of chemotherapeutic drugs on fertility was not considered main-
stream oncology research: indeed, it was seldom funded by oncology
239. Woodruff, supra note 237, at 7. The grant application describes the unmet needs of
the cancer-survivor community in these terms. The “information gap” refers to the lack of
information regarding cancer treatment’s effect on fertility and fertility preservation op-
tions to newly diagnosed cancer patients. The “data gap” refers to the “paucity of data on
the precise gonadotoxicity of cancer drugs,” and the “option gap” refers to the lack of
research into fertility preservation techniques for females, including pre-pubescent girls.
Woodruff, supra note 237, at 9–10.
240. Teresa K. Woodruff, Administrative Core, THE ONCOFERTILITY CONSORTIUM,
http://oncofertility.northwestern.edu/resources/administrative-core [https://perma.cc/
XNS4-RR8J].
241. Interview with Oncofertility Grant Principal Investigator, Basic Sciences Track, in
Chicago, IL (October 8, 2014; March 13, 2015).
242. Woodruff, supra note 237, at 9 (“[M]edical oncologists are not aware of the precise
reproductive threats of their treatments on reproductive outcomes and clinical reproduc-
tive endocrinologists do not routinely treat cancer patients.”).
243. Telephone interview with Principal Investigator in Oncology (Mar. 10, 2015); tele-
phone interview with Principal Investigator in Reproductive Endocrinology (Mar. 13,
2015).
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grants.244 On the clinical side, the gold standard for evaluating the success
of a treatment program in clinical oncology was survival rates—a treat-
ment’s effect on fertility was often not even part of a research design.245
The perception of one Oncofertility consortium member captures what
was reported by a majority of interviewees: “I find that in our area any-
way the oncologists are a little bit resistant to participating in studies such
as these, it’s not really high on their list of priorities.”246
Oncologists’ research priorities developed into particular practice
styles and protocols that became entrenched routines. Fertility preserva-
tion required a significant modification of these established practice rou-
tines. For example, a clinician member of the consortium remarked,
[t]here are individuals who have styles of practice. The issue for
oncologists is living or dying. From the outset you see patients for
cancer, the team says so and so has this cancer, and it’s very hard and
you don’t know how much they have to live. . . . My colleagues in
oncology, they are so busy and they are so much dealing with living
and dying issues. How to treat the cancer, what kind of cancer is it.
They are getting pulled in all different directions about taking the
cancer out. Talking about fertility preservation is not in their
agenda.247
The Oncofertility consortium attempted to change these entrenched
practice styles by requiring treating oncologists to ask fertility-related
questions before they could officially “close” their patient intake forms
(and thus record a patient appointment as finished in their electronic
records). Interviewees report, however, that this initiative was met with
strong resistance from oncology groups.
These evaluative frames that prioritized survival rates also influenced
how oncologists construed the priorities of their own patients, which did
not include a focus on fertility preservation. A principal investigator with
a background in endocrinology described her experience speaking with
oncologists as follows: “they would tell me, we don’t worry about [fertil-
ity], [the patients] should really think about that later and they are not
married so they are not even thinking about that.”248 Another inter-
viewee similarly remarked:
these physicians had in-bred biases about how to deliver care to
these patients. And those biases ran again from “Don’t bother her,
she’s got enough on her mind right now, my focus is on getting her
well. Don’t worry about the esoteric stuff, she can’t afford this. Don’t
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. 2007 Oncofertility Consortium Conference, The Oncofertility Consortium (Dec. 9,
2007), http://oncofertility.northwestern.edu/resources/npc-panel [https://perma.cc/LPZ7-
PC99] (navigate to endocrinology participant comment at 42:00).
247. Interview with Oncofertility Grant Principal Investigator in Clinical Practice, in
Chicago, IL (Feb. 24, 2015).
248. Interview with Oncofertility Grant Principal Investigator, Basic Research track, in
Chicago, IL (March 13, 2015).
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even bring it up.”249
The second community, that of reproductive endocrinologists, did not
routinely treat cancer patients; rather, it was used to treating generally
healthy patients whose only diagnosis was infertility, and their frames for
evaluating treatment success and research priorities aligned with the pri-
orities of this subpopulation—understanding the reproductive system of
otherwise healthy patients. As one Oncofertility physician remarked:
If you go into an infertility clinic, the vast majority of patients that
you’re gonna see in that waiting room are women, over the age of 35,
who’ve been trying to get pregnant for a long time and are typically
very well and very healthy patients. They’re dealing with infertility,
which is a horrific diagnosis and it is hard to deal with, but for the
most part that’s their main concern. . . . When we’re talking about
oncology, we’re talking about very acutely sick patients. Sometimes,
the patient’s so sick that they’re in-patient.250
This focus on age-related infertility led to entrenched treatment rou-
tines tailored for otherwise healthy women with an infertility diagnosis.
As explained by several consortium members: “Most IVF places have a
programmed and linear way of bringing people through an IVF cycle.
Patients are taken through step-wise. Now we have patients who need to
be shunted into IVF tomorrow afternoon. We are used to consumer-
driven type of care, this group is more of an emergent-care, medically
driven type of care.”251 For this reason, tailoring both research and medi-
cal care to oncology patients required a radical reorganization of the
practice routines of reproductive endocrinologists:
As a fertility specialist, I’m asking you now to see a patient the same
day. I don’t care if you have a three-month waiting list. This patient’s
not waiting. You’re gonna see them right now. I’m asking you to take
care of a patient who might be sicker, her blood counts might be
different than what you’re used to seeing. I’m asking you to step
outside of your comfort level of having normal healthy patients and
seeing someone who is not so perfectly blood count wise normal.
And make sure you’re okay with that.252
How, then, did these two communities overcome their different evalua-
tive frames and research priorities to work on a joint project that neither
community prioritized? Crucially, the barriers separating the two commu-
nities not only prevented working on a common problem (fertility preser-
vation) but also prevented the realization that there was a problem to
begin with that required the joint efforts of both communities. As a prin-
cipal investigator in the original grant application emphasized: “You had
249. Interview with Oncofertility Grant Administrator, in Chicago, IL (July 23, 2015).
250. Interview with Oncofertility Grant Patient Navigator, in Chicago, IL (Mar. 19,
2015).
251. Id.
252. Interview with Oncofertility Grant Patient Navigator, in Chicago, IL (Mar. 19,
2015).
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issues on both sides of the equation so it wasn’t that there was a fault line.
It was just that there was no conceptualization of the issues.”253 Thus, con-
ceptualizing the need for research in what is now called the field of
oncofertility is itself an example of “problem finding.” As interviewees
recount the process of team assembly, the original problem finding in-
sight was a case of brokerage: the principal investigator for the Oncofer-
tility grant, herself an endocrinologist, became the head of a cancer
center and therefore had access to complementary information from both
disciplines.254
During my interviews, oncofertility researchers recount many addi-
tional cases of problem finding during their joint research that emerged
precisely because basic researchers from multiple disciplines (biomedical
engineering, oncology, reproductive endocrinology, and primate biology)
worked together to figure out a way to stimulate the growth of follicles
outside the body (in vitro), and they shared their findings in monthly lab-
oratory meetings. In other words, interviewees reported that these
problems would not have been discovered (or would not have been dis-
covered as quickly) but for the boundary-crossing interactions facilitated
by the Oncofertility Consortium. Problem-finding in the context of this
boundary-crossing teamwork led to what participants considered to be
their most important findings.
The following passage from a researcher working with monkey ovaries
vividly recounts how the team quickly came to recognize a problem with
follicle growth in monkeys that could not be observed in rodents (the
most popular model used in the laboratory by basic researchers) and that
more closely resembled the situation in human ovaries:
What we found for example was that some of the follicles would ac-
tually just sit there and look at you. And then you had others that
would grow over the five weeks and turn into these beautiful, gor-
geous antral follicles. And you’d say, “What’s this heterogeneity? Do
you see this in the rodent?” And they [researchers working on a ro-
dent model] would go, “No.” . . . Then you think, “Well, so how does
this relate to follicles from humans?” We found if we took follicles
from young, reproductive age monkeys—what would be considered
20 year olds in humans—they did really well, would give us a lot of
those large growing follicles. If we took them from the animals, that
were over 15 years of age, we didn’t. . .And we thought, “Well, what
did this mean for the cancer patients that’s 40 or 35 as opposed to
20?” It made us think on a much broader scale and made us think that
immediately because we were having these tremendous and exciting
253. Interview with Oncofertility Grant Principal Investigator, in Chicago, IL (Mar. 13,
2015).
254. Telephone interview with Principal Investigator in Oncology (Mar. 10, 2015); tele-
phone interview with Principal Investigator in Reproductive Endocrinology (Mar. 13,
2015); telephone interview with Oncofertility Grant Administrator (Mar. 3, 2015); tele-
phone interview with Oncofertility Grant Administrator (July 21, 2015).
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lab meetings every month.255
In other words, when working together, monkey and mouse research-
ers were able to discover a discrepancy in how mouse and monkey ova-
ries behaved when grown in culture (outside the body). It turned out that
a significant portion of monkey follicles simply did not progress into ma-
ture eggs. Mouse follicles did not display this “heterogeneity.” Upon fur-
ther investigation (prompted only by the finding of this discrepancy),
monkey researchers realized that this inability of a significant portion of
monkey follicles to mature into eggs was related to the age of the monkey
donor female: in young monkeys, most if not all follicles matured, but in
older monkeys they did not. Because monkeys are more closely related to
humans than mice, the researchers could extrapolate their findings to
humans, leading to further questions and research regarding the effect of
maternal age on follicle maturation in humans.
What is important to recognize is that this example of problem finding
required more than a preferred network position with access to data from
both fields, which could then be combined to make a new discovery (as
brokerage is conceptualized in Burt’s model). Rather, knowledge about
new problems emerged from the regular interactions and sharing of raw
data between multiple communities—it was a synergistic, emergent prop-
erty of relationships across communities that happened at the structural
fold created by the Oncofertility consortium.
D. A TAXONOMY OF SOCIAL NETWORK FAILURE
Taken together with social network theory, these case studies allow us
to answer the important yet overlooked questions posed in Part I: What
does it mean in fact for information to be free of legal encumberments?
How is it in fact accessed by social actors? Are there any other barriers to
“accessibility”? And, switching vantage points from seeking those condi-
tions that enable individual autonomy and creativity to those that opti-
mize resource management, why have complex problems resisted study
and treatment?
The three case studies described above show that, even if information
is free of legal encumberments—unprotected by patents or trade
secrets—social barriers prevent innovators from fully accessing or fully
taking advantage of such nominally “free” information. How social actors
in fact search for information is deeply influenced by innovators’ search
strategies. In turn, as illustrated by the three case studies above, these
strategies are constrained by social factors: (1) lack of social-cognitive ties
between communities of practice with complementary information or
skills; (2) large cognitive distances between communities of practice; (3)
different (and often clashing) evaluative frames leading to different re-
255. Telephone interview with Principal Investigator in Reproductive Endocrinology
working with Rhesus Monkeys (Feb. 23, 2015).
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search priorities.256 Complex problems have resisted study and treatment
in large part because of these difficulties in bringing together the diverse
sources of knowledge that are often needed to address them. The three
social factors described above make it difficult to create a structural fold
where teams can work together to build trust and develop a common
language that bridges large cognitive distances.
Crucially, all three case studies place problem-finding and problem-
framing at the center of breakthrough innovative activity. It is precisely
by delaying problem-finding and problem-framing at the intersection of
multiple communities of practice that these three social barriers to the
flow of information delay (or block) breakthrough innovation. By treat-
ing information as free-flowing, and by conceptualizing innovation simply
as the process of solving pre-existing problems, patent law theory and
doctrine ignore these important insights. The next two Parts of this Arti-
cle engage precisely with the implications of the insights gathered from
social network theory and these case studies for patent doctrine and inno-
vation theory more broadly.
Social Network Failure Example
Lack of social-cognitive ties Tobacco Research
Cognitive distance Kadison-Singer Problem
Different (clashing) evaluative frames Oncofertility
Figure 5: A Taxonomy of Social Network Failures.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR PATENT LAW DOCTRINE
The previous parts of this Article have both brought to light and chal-
lenged the twin assumptions about the nature of information flow and the
origin of ideas that pervade market failure analyses of innovation. Patent
law doctrine, whose development owes much to market failure analyses
of innovation incentives, echoes these assumptions. By ignoring social
network effects on information flow and the origin of breakthrough inno-
vation, however, patent law’s incentive structure is ultimately misaligned
with how innovation happens on the ground.
Three key patentability doctrines—novelty, obviousness, and utility—
are concerned with weeding out innovations that do not require a patent
incentive (or for which granting a patent would lead to socially inefficient
results). Novelty is codified in section 102 of the 1952 Patent Act and the
America Invents Act.257 In both Acts, novelty requires an invention to be
256. See infra Figure 5.
257. Two patent acts are relevant for unexpired U.S. patents. The Leahy-Smith
America Invents Act (AIA), which went into effect in 2012, covers all patents filed on or
after March 16, 2013. See Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 285 (codified as amended in 35
U.S.C. § 102 (2012)). The Act that the AIA replaced, the 1952 Patent Act, governs all
unexpired patents filed before that date. Act of Jul. 19, 1952, Pub. L. No. 593, 66 Stat. 792.
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“new.”258 In other words, innovators cannot obtain the right to exclude
others for inventions that the public already possesses, either because
these inventions are in the public domain, or because they are covered by
a patent granted to another inventor.259 The obviousness requirement—
first announced by the Supreme Court in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood260 and
later codified in section 103 of the 1952 Patent Act and the America In-
vents Act261—requires patentable inventions to show a degree of inven-
tiveness in addition to novelty.262 In the words of the Hotchkiss Court, an
invention deserving of a patent must show a “degree of skill and ingenu-
ity [beyond that of an “ordinary mechanic”] which constitute essential
elements of every invention.”263 As codified in section 103, a patent “may
not be obtained . . . if the differences between the claimed invention and
the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have
been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a
person having ordinary skill in the art . . . .”264 The obviousness require-
ment is often explained in economic terms: market pressures and market
competition are likely to lead “ordinary mechanic[s]”265 to make routine
improvements to existing technology—negating the need for a patent on
these “obvious” inventions. The utility requirement, codified in section
101 of the 1952 Patent Act and the America Invents Act,266 requires that
an invention have a “significant” and “immediate benefit to the
public.”267
258. The relevant statutory language from the 1952 Act reads:
Conditions for patentability; novelty and loss of right to patent: . . . A person
shall be entitled to a patent unless—(a) the invention was known or used by
others in this country, or patented or described in a printed publication in
this or a foreign country, before the invention thereof by the applicant for a
patent.
Ch. 10, § 102, 66 Stat. 792, 797 (1952) (current version at 35 U.S.C. § 102). The newly
amended Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2011, 35 U.S.C. § 102, reads: “Conditions
for patentability; novelty: . . . A person shall be entitled to a patent unless—(1) the claimed
invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or
otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.”
§ 102.
259. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Inherency, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV.
371, 383–84 (2005); Kevin Emerson Collins, The Knowledge/Embodiment Dichotomy, 47
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1279, 1308–09 (2014); Joshua D. Sarnoff, Patent-Eligible Inventions
After Bilski: History and Theory, 63 HASTINGS L. J. 53, 101–02 (2011).
260. 52 U.S. 248, 267 (1850).
261. See 35 U.S.C. § 103.
262. See, e.g., John Duffy, Inventing Invention: A Case Study of Legal Innovation, 86
TEX. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2007) (explaining the legal origins of the obviousness doctrine).
263. Hotchkiss, 52 U.S. at 267.
264. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (explaining “[c]onditions for patentability; non-obvious subject
matter”).
265. Hotchkiss, 52 U.S. at 265, 267.
266. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (“Inventions patentable[:] Whoever invents or discovers any new
and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and require-
ments of this title.”) (emphasis added).
267. In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting Nelson v. Bowler, 626
F.2d 853, 856 (C.C.P.A. 1980)) (emphasis omitted).
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Both novelty and obviousness rely on identifying a body of publicly
available knowledge or “prior art” against which to assess the novelty and
obviousness of the invention seeking patent protection.268 Relying on
market failure models of innovation, which predict that the sum of
human knowledge will be easily available to innovators to address techni-
cal problems once access costs decrease, courts have systematically wid-
ened the amount of prior art that is considered accessible to a person
having ordinary skill in the art.269 And just as market failure analyses of
innovation treat the origin of problems to be solved (and of those ideas
that attempt to solve them) as exogenous to economic analyses of innova-
tion, so does patent law, through its utility and obviousness doctrines,
assume that problems to be solved are simply out there.270 As we have
seen in the previous sections, however, in many breakthrough innova-
tions, the bottleneck is actually problem-finding and problem-framing.
The next three sections elaborate how these twin assumptions underlie
court decisions in the patentability doctrines of novelty, obviousness and
utility, and make the case for correcting them.
A. THE FREE FLOW ASSUMPTION IN PATENT DOCTRINE NOVELTY
Novelty appears to be a straightforward inquiry: it denies patent pro-
tection when every single element of a patent claim is present in a single
piece of prior art (a single publication or a single publicly known inven-
tion).271 There is an evident reason to require that a patent be “new”:
there is no justification for granting a patent monopoly for an invention
that the public already possesses. Because it treats the public domain as a
uniform repository of information, however, the novelty doctrine does
not consider the transport and repurposing of an invention from one
community to another as an act of invention. Take, for example, the in-
vention in In re Schreiber.272 The invention claimed, “A dispensing top
for passing only several kernels of a popped popcorn at a time from an
open-ended container filled with popped popcorn.”273 The court rejected
claim one of the invention as inherently anticipated by the “Harz” Swiss
patent.274 The Harz patent disclosed “‘a spout for nozzle-ready canisters,’
which may be tapered inward in a conical fashion, . . . for purposes such
as dispensing oil from an oil can.”275 In essence, the court reasoned that
the device described in the “Harz” patent as an oil dispenser could be
268. ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POL-
ICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 337–38, 606 (LexisNexis, 6th ed. 2013).
269. See infra Part IV.A. Obviousness.
270. See infra Part IV.B. Obviousness & Utility.
271. See, e.g., Verdegaal Bros., Inc. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir.
1987) (Anticipation requires that “each and every element as set forth in the claim is
found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior art reference.”).
272. 128 F.3d 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
273. Id. at 1475.
274. Id. at 1477–78.
275. Id. at 1475.
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repurposed to serve as a popcorn dispenser.276 But recognizing the organ-
ization of knowledge space in separate innovation communities, rather
than in a uniform public domain, can raise doubts about this decision.
Migrating and repurposing the oil can container may indeed constitute a
“novel” public benefit.277
Nevertheless, there is good reason from a policy perspective to con-
clude that considering such migrations a “new” product innovation de-
serving of patent protection would—on average—retard rather than
foster innovation. When an innovation requires the migration of an inno-
vation “as is” from one community to another (rather than the recombi-
nation and synthesis of elements from cognitively distant communities),
network barriers—lack of social-cognitive ties among relevant communi-
ties—are likely relatively low given the continued decrease in access
costs.278 Indeed, other innovation policy levers, such as constructing effi-
cient knowledge infrastructures for searching patent documents world-
wide, are better suited to foster the migration and repurposing of
innovations from one community to another.279
It is in the doctrines of obviousness and utility, which I take up below,
that judicial opinions assuming the free-flow of information across com-
munities, and treating problem-finding and framing as exogenous, dis-
incentivize the type of breakthrough innovation that requires deep and
frequent interaction between groups with different cognitive repertoires.
1. Obviousness
A watershed decision in obviousness jurisprudence, KSR v. Teleflex,280
incorporates quite explicitly market failure analyses of innovation. In re-
placing the previous rigid test for obviousness with a flexible inquiry, the
Court repeatedly emphasizes the importance of taking into account the
impact of market forces on the direction of innovation and on the search
strategies likely to be employed by innovators—seeking to exclude from
patent protection those “predictable” inventions that are unlikely to re-
sult in market failures.281 In previous work, I have argued that the
276. Id. at 1478 (finding that the oil can dispenser was “inherently” capable of dispens-
ing a few kernels of popcorn, as described by the Schreiber patent application).
277. Current novelty case law also raises the question: should the oil dispenser inventor
benefit from the repurposing of his/her invention as a popcorn machine? The answer under
current doctrine is yes: the popcorn machine literally infringes the Hertz patent, allowing
the oil dispenser inventor to appropriate the social benefits of this repurposing. See
Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 949 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“An infringe-
ment analysis, thus, requires that the courts look at each element of the claim, that is,
proceed through the claim element-by-element, and look for correspondence in the alleg-
edly infringing device.”).
278. See supra Part II.B.
279. See infra Part V.A.
280. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
281. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 401 (2007). Christopher Cotropia has
called this decision “Type I predictability,” in which “the more predictable it is to use the
prior art to make the invention, the more likely there was already a reason at the time of
the invention for those of ordinary skill to make the necessary changes.” Christopher A.
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Court’s decision in KSR can be interpreted as an invitation to incorporate
not only economic but also social and psychological analysis into contex-
tual determinations of non-obviousness.282 But regardless of whether one
interprets KSR as opening the door for a more grounded understanding
of how scientific and technical research actually takes place, one thing is
clear from the decision: the scope of prior art that a court can consider in
assessing obviousness has expanded.283 In an oft-quoted passage, the
Court emphasizes: “design incentives and other market forces can
prompt variations of [a work available in one field of endeavor], either in
the same field or in another.”284 The Court goes on to note that “familiar
items may have obvious uses beyond their primary purposes, and a per-
son of ordinary skill often will be able to fit the teachings of multiple
patents together like pieces of a puzzle.”285 In other words, market pres-
sures will incentivize a “person having ordinary skill in the art”
(PHOSITA) to search broadly for information in its own community of
practice and others.286 And both the Federal Circuit and academic com-
mentators have interpreted the Court’s decision as “direct[ing] [courts] to
construe the scope of analogous art broadly.”287
The Court’s expansive view of a PHOSITA’s search strategies and ac-
cess to information from multiple communities immediately lends itself to
the following questions: how broadly would a putative inventor search for
a solution? Should the sum of human knowledge be considered accessible
to a PHOSITA when trying to solve a particular problem? And if not,
what limits should be placed on the quantity of information available to a
Cotropia, Predictability and Nonobviousness in Patent Law After KSR, 20 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 391, 391, 403 (2014).
282. Laura Pedraza-Farin˜a, Patent Law and the Sociology of Innovation, 2013 WIS. L.
REV. 813, 825–26 (2013).
283. The expansion of the scope of the prior art inquiry is likely also a judicial response
to the critique that, by failing to account for inventor creativity and lowered access costs,
courts (and the Federal Circuit in particular) granted too many obvious patents that had
the cumulative effect of impeding follow-on innovation. See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz &
John F. Duffy, The Inducement Standard of Patentability, 120 YALE L. J. 1590, 1597–98
(2011); Margo A. Bagley, Internet Business Model Patents: Obvious by Analogy, 7 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 253, 258 (2001); Daralyn J. Durie & Mark A. Lemley, A
Realistic Approach to the Obviousness of Inventions, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 989, 990–91
(2008); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Obvious to Whom? Evaluating Inventions from the Perspec-
tive of PHOSITA, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 885, 885 (2004); Brenda M. Simon, The Impli-
cations of Technological Advancement for Obviousness, 19 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L.
REV. 331, 333–34 (2013); Ryan Whalen, Second-Order Obviousness: How Information and
Communication Technologies Make Inventions More Obvious and Why the Law Should
Care, 97 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 597, 600 (2015).
284. KSR, 550 U.S. at 401.
285. Id. at 402.
286. A “person having ordinary skill in the art” (PHOSITA) is a “hypothetical person,”
which has been likened to the “reasonable person” of tort law. Panduit Corp. v. Dennison
Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (explaining that “‘a person having ordinary
skill in the art’ [is] not unlike the ‘reasonable man’ and other ghosts in the law”); see also
Jonathan J. Darrow, The Neglected Dimension of Patent Law’s PHOSITA Standard, 23
HARV. J. L. & TECH. 227, 227–28 (2009).
287. Wyers v. Master Lock Co., 616 F.3d 1231,1238 (Fed. Cir. 2010); see also Jacob S.
Sherkow, Negativing Invention, 2011 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1091, 1118–20 (2011); Simon, supra
note 283, 339–40.
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PHOSITA to make his/her invention? While making clear that the scope
of the search was broad, the Court in KSR left this inquiry open for lower
courts (and in particular the Federal Circuit) to elucidate. Patent law doc-
trine’s response to this inquiry is the doctrine of analogous arts.288
The analogous arts doctrine in essence requires courts to, first, identify
the “field of endeavor” for the invention at issue and, second, define the
scope of “analogous” fields that an inventor in that field would be ex-
pected to access.289 Courts have formalized the analogous arts doctrine
into a two-pronged test: a reference is “analogous” if (1) “it is from the
same field of endeavor, regardless of the problem addressed” or (2) “if
the reference is not within the field of the inventor’s endeavor, . . . the
reference still is reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with
which the inventor is involved.”290 Courts, however, have struggled with
applying this test in a predictable and consistent manner.
Regarding prong one, the Federal Circuit has recently clarified that the
scope of a field of endeavor should be determined “by reference to expla-
nations of the invention’s subject matter in the patent application, includ-
ing the embodiments, function, and structure of the claimed
invention.”291 Applying this standard, one court held that “a person of
ordinary skill, seeking to solve a problem of fastening a hose clamp,
would reasonably be expected or motivated to look to fasteners for gar-
ments.”292 Yet another court held that the similarity in the “structure” of
toothbrushes and hairbrushes dictated a finding that hairbrush and tooth-
brush design were part of the same field of endeavor.293
In a more recent and prominent case, Apple Inc. v. Samsung Electron-
ics Co., Ltd., the Federal Circuit reasoned that Apple’s “slide to unlock”
#721 patent and a prior art reference concerning touchscreen technology
for wall-mounted devices were in the same field of endeavor because they
“disclose[d] essentially the same structure—a touchscreen device with
software that allows the user to slide his finger across the screen to
288. The analogous arts doctrine pre-dates KSR v. Teleflex, but it was hardly used by
courts because the old non-obviousness test, the teaching-suggestion-motivation (TSM)
test, narrowed the prior art to references that were already in communication with each
other. See Pedraza-Farin˜a, supra note 282, at 861–862.
289. The two-prong test as most recently articulated by the Federal Circuit in Apple v.
Samsung is:
A reference qualifies as analogous prior art if it is [a] “from the same field of
endeavor, [determined by “the invention’s subject matter in the patent appli-
cation including the embodiments, function, and structure of the claimed in-
vention”] regardless of the problem addressed”[;] or [b] “if the reference is
not within the field of the inventor’s endeavor, . . . the reference still is rea-
sonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor is
involved.”
Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co. Ltd., 816 F.3d 788, 802 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Wyers,
616 F.3d at 1237).
290. Id. (quoting Wyers, 616 F.3d at 1237) (internal quotation marks omitted).
291. In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
292. In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1447 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
293. Bigio, 381 F.3d at 1327.
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change interface states.”294 On their end, Apple argued that there were
two fields of inquiry at issue: one pertaining to cellular telephony and
another to wall-mounted devices, such as home alarm systems.295
At this level of abstraction it is hard to know whether these cases were
correctly decided, and indeed it is hard to reconcile courts’ decisions in
the Bigio and Oetiker cases. In Apple v. Samsung, it is quite possible that
members of the two communities dealing with wall-mounted touch-
screens and cellular telephony were in close communication with each
other. It is equally as possible that they were not—at least not before
Apple made its “slide to unlock” innovation. Indeed, if the history of the
development of cellular telephones provides any guidance (which soci-
ologists describe as the “uneasy” bringing together of radio and tele-
phone engineers—two communities with “deep rooted” differences),296
the merger of touchscreen technology initially designed for home security
systems with cellular telephones may indeed be a novel, breakthrough
recombination bringing together two communities previously distant
from each other. Common sense can tell us little about the organization
of knowledge communities (and the interactions between them) in
knowledge space. What we do know—as Parts II and III show—is that
subcommunities of practice can be quite small and that popular, “com-
mon sense” conceptions of an interconnected world where interdis-
ciplinarity is the norm are often incorrect.297
The analogous art inquiry does not end with a determination of what
constitutes a relevant field of inquiry. Rather, prong two directs courts to
ascertain “the nature of the problem to be solved”298 and, from that van-
tage point, consider whether the prior art at issue “logically would have
commended itself to an inventor’s attention in considering his prob-
lem.”299 Notice how prong two places problem-solving squarely at the
center of the courts’ conception of innovative activity while assuming that
problems to be solved are out there waiting-to-be solved. The next sec-
tion explores and problematizes this assumption in patent doctrine.
B. THE ORIGIN OF IDEAS ASSUMPTION IN PATENT DOCTRINE
Part I described the view of innovation shared by market failure theo-
ries: problems to be solved, and ideas to solve them, are exogenous to
294. 816 F.3d at 803.
295. Id. at 802–03.
296. LESTER & PIORE, supra note 178, at 17 (“The companies that pioneered cellular
[technology] typically came from either the radio or the telephone side of the business. . . .
Each faced the major challenge of finding a partner who understood the other side of the
technology and then learning to work intimately with that partner to create the new prod-
uct. Not an easy task. The cultural differences between radio and telephone engineering
were deep-rooted.”).
297. See, e.g., Apple v. Samsung, 816 F.3d at 809 (“Considering the ‘reality of the cir-
cumstances—in other words, common sense,’ a skilled artisan would have considered
Xrgomics to be within the scope of the art searched.”).
298. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 414 (2007).
299. In re Clay, 966 F.2d 656, 659 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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economic analyses of innovation.300 Court opinions take a similar view:
innovation involves a “series of discrete problems and an associated se-
ries of decisions and choices about which of those problems to solve and
how best to solve them.”301 This view of innovation is implicit in the Fed-
eral Circuit’s obviousness and utility jurisprudence. As a consequence,
patent law emphasizes (and thus incentivizes) problem-solving while
deemphasizing (and thus disincentivizing) problem-finding and problem-
framing.
1. Obviousness
KSR itself framed innovation entirely as an exercise in problem-solv-
ing. The Court emphasized that “[u]nder the correct analysis, any need or
problem known in the [field of endeavor at the time of invention] and
addressed by the patent can provide a reason for combining the elements
in the manner claimed.”302 Similarly, secondary considerations—a list of
factors courts use as proxies for assessing obviousness or non-obviousness
of an invention—favor those innovators who provide a solution to long-
standing problems but are silent regarding breakthrough problem-find-
ing.303 More specifically, two secondary considerations, “long felt need”
and “failure of others,” have long been used to reward innovative prob-
lem-solving.304 Finally, prong two of the analogous arts doctrine, similarly
focuses squarely on identifying relevant prior art by reference to “the
particular problem with which the inventor is involved,”305 omitting any
discussion on problem-finding.306 Because prong two of the analogous art
doctrine has a large impact on the breadth of prior art considered by the
court, the next paragraphs focus more in depth on how courts have car-
ried out prong two analyses—identifying important biases against prob-
lem-framing and problem-finding.
How narrowly or broadly to frame the problem that the inventor was
trying to solve is a key inquiry in analogous art jurisprudence. Patentees
have an incentive to frame the problem narrowly to avoid prior art, while
putative infringers have the opposite set of incentives. Faced with con-
flicting definitions of the “problem to be solved,” courts have used an ad
hoc approach, often relying on their own “common sense” to choose
among possible problem framings. As Parts II and III show, however,
300. See supra Part I.B.
301. LESTER & PIORE, supra note 178, at 7.
302. KSR, 550 U.S. at 402.
303. See generally Natalie A. Thomas, Note, Secondary Considerations in Nonobvious-
ness Analysis: The Use of Objective Indicia Following KSR v. Teleflex, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV.
2070, 2075 (2011).
304. See, e.g., C. Dylan Turner, In Cyclobenzaprine, an Objective Failure to Reach a
Long-Felt Need in Secondary Considerations Jurisprudence, 13 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL.
PROP. 359, 362 (2015).
305. Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co. Ltd., 816 F.3d 788, 802 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
306. Although “familiar items may have obvious uses beyond their primary purposes,”
KSR, 550 U.S. at 420, a reference is only reasonably pertinent when it “logically would
have commended itself to an inventor’s attention in considering his problem,” In re Clay,
966 F.2d 656, 659 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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problem framing can be an important step in breakthrough innovation—
by taking it upon itself to “reframe” the problem in hindsight, courts are
ignoring an important step in innovation.307
For example, in the Apple v. Samsung litigation, the Federal Circuit
considered two different ways of framing the problem addressed by the
patent.308 Apple framed the problem to be solved as “pocket dialing”—
the inadvertent activation of features in a portable device with a touch-
screen.309 Because the prior art “describes a wall-mounted device to con-
trol home appliances like air-conditioning units and heaters,” Apple
argued, “a skilled artisan would not naturally turn to [the prior art] for
solving the ‘pocket dialing’ problem.”310 In contrast, Samsung framed the
problem as one of designing user interfaces that employ touch-sensitive
displays.311 The Federal Circuit agreed with Samsung, concluding that
“the problem faced by both the inventors of the #721 patent and the au-
thors of [the prior art reference] was similar—how to create intuitive,
easy to understand interfaces for changing states on touchscreen devices.
A skilled artisan would naturally turn to references like [prior art in
touchscreen technology] to find solutions.”312 What the Federal Circuit’s
opinion overlooks is that understanding that both security system and cell
phone designers faced similar design problems, and framing the problem
of designing a user friendly interface for home entertainment and security
systems as one of pocket dialing may, in itself, be an innovative contribu-
tion—particularly if these two communities were not in routine commu-
nication.313 Much like the solving of the Kadison-Singer problem, which
required recognizing that the “sparsifying” problem facing computer
scientists was the same as the “linear algebra matrices” problem in the
several mathematics subcommunities, a key step in Apple’s innovation
may have been framing the “pocket dialing” problem as a problem pre-
sent in home security systems.314
Not only does patent law privilege problem solving, but in some of its
recent cases, it actively discounts problem-finding and problem-framing
as an important source of innovative activity worth of reward. Courts
307. See Gregory N. Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious: Empirical Demonstration that the
Hindsight Bias Renders Patent Decisions Irrational, 67 OHIO ST. L. J. 1391 (2006); Gregory
N. Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious II: Experimental Study on the Hindsight Issue Before the
Supreme Court in KSR v. Teleflex, 9 YALE J. L. & TECH. 1 (2007).
308. Apple, 816 F.3d at 799–803.
309. Id. at 803.
310. Id.
311. Id. at 802.
312. Id. at 803 (emphasis added).
313. For example, in their three case studies of technological innovation in the cell
phone, jean design, and medical device industries, Lester and Piore emphasize:
“[I]ntegration turned out to be absolutely central in each of our case studies . . . . Without
integration across the borders separating these different fields, there would have been no
new products at all.” LESTER & PIORE, supra note 178, at 14–15.
314. See Verizon Servs. Corp. v. Cox Fibernet Va., Inc., 602 F.3d 1325, 1338 (Fed. Cir.
2010) (finding that references relating to telephony and wireless communication were rele-
vant to the Internet and network protocols because the “problem facing the inventors of
the Network Patents was related to” the problem faced by the prior art references).
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often consider the problem the inventor was trying to solve as a given—
even if that problem was initially identified by the inventor him/herself
and was, until then, unknown in the prior art. As Parts II and III dis-
cussed, this is problematic because for many breakthrough innovations,
once a problem is correctly identified and framed, a solution can often
reveal itself.315 In other words, it is often the finding and framing of the
problem, not its solution, that is nonobvious.
The following case illustrates this point. The invention in Scientific
Plastic Products v. Biotage concerned a low-cost, resealable cartridge that
provides a tight seal under pressure for a chemical purification technique
called “low-pressure liquid chromatography.”316 The primary issue in liti-
gation was whether this invention was obvious in light of three refer-
ences: the “Yamada” reference in the field of low-pressure liquid
chromatography, and two references concerning the design of soda-pop
bottle caps.317 The Yamada reference contained all the elements in the
invention at issue, except for a special type of seal designed to prevent
leaking under high pressure, which was present in the soda-pop bottle
caps.318 In holding the invention obvious, the Federal Circuit reasoned
that: “Here, the [soda-pop] references address the problem of providing a
fluid tight seal at elevated pressures, between a container and a reseal-
able cap. This is sufficiently close to the problem addressed by the
claimed invention; substantial evidence supports the Board’s finding that
King and Strassheimer are available as prior art.”319 What the Federal
Circuit overlooks, however, is that “the problem addressed by the
claimed invention” was a design flaw that was identified by the patentees
themselves. In essence, the court’s opinion takes a problem identified and
framed by the patentees as a given, and judges the obviousness of its solu-
tion in light of that problem. Judge Moore, dissenting, recognized this
point.320 Judge Moore emphasized: “This statement [of a leakage prob-
lem], in the patents, is not a recognition of a known prior art problem
that would have motivated one of skill in the art to want to modify the
Yamada design. It was a problem identified, not in the prior art, but by
these inventors. . . . These inventors identified a design problem, articu-
lated it, and solved it.”321 The Supreme Court’s 2015 denial of certiorari
in this case is a missed opportunity to clarify the role of problem-finding
and problem-framing in non-obviousness jurisprudence.322
315. See supra Part II.C & Part III.
316. Sci. Plastic Prod., Inc. v. Biotage AB, 766 F.3d 1355, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2014), cert.
denied, 135 S. Ct. 2380 (2015).
317. Id. at 1358.
318. Id. at 1360.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 1362 (Moore, J., dissenting).
321. Id. at 1362–63.
322. The question presented was “Whether an ‘implicit’ acknowledgment of a ‘poten-
tial’ problem or ‘concern,’ . . . is consistent with this Court’s anti-hindsight jurisprudence
requiring substantial evidence of a ‘known problem’ to provide a reason for combining
references for an obviousness determination.” Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i-ii, Sci.
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2. Utility
Patent law’s emphasis on problem-solving is also evident in the third
patentability doctrine: utility.323 The utility requirement, codified in sec-
tion 101 of the patent act, requires that an invention have a “significant”
and “immediate benefit to the public.”324 In other words, to be “useful,”
an invention must directly solve a specific public problem. Although util-
ity is generally not a barrier to patentability for most inventions, the doc-
trine has been interpreted to bar patentability for chemicals and
processes for making them, when no immediate benefit to the public
from their use can be shown.325 In the leading utility case, Brenner v.
Manson, the Supreme Court denied a patent on a process for producing a
steroid that had no known use in humans, despite its similarity to other
steroids that had been found to inhibit tumors in mice.326 In so doing, the
Court emphasized that “a patent is not a hunting license. It is not a re-
ward for the search, but compensation for its successful conclusion.”327
Following Brenner, the Federal Circuit has used this rationale to deny
patents to chemical structures, chemical intermediaries, research tools,
and, more broadly, to chemicals with no known use to the public at the
time of the patent application—even if those chemicals have a clear use
to specific research communities.328
Summarizing its view on utility, the Federal Circuit explained: “inven-
tions do not meet the utility requirement if they are ‘objects upon which
scientific research could be performed with no assurance that anything
useful will be discovered in the end.’”329 The discovery of “objects upon
which scientific research could be performed,”330 however, amounts to
problem-finding and problem-framing. In some ways, the reasoning of
the Court is exactly backwards: discovering “objects upon which scientific
research could be performed”331 is often in itself more useful to scientific
advances (and ultimately to the public) than discovering a single specific
use for an existing chemical (an activity that is patentable).332 This is be-
cause, as the case studies in Part III demonstrate, finding a new problem
Plastic Prods., Inc. v. Biotage AB, 766 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (No. 14-1186), 2015 WL
1384354, at *1.
323. See, e.g., Fromer, supra note 118, at 1444.
324. In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing Nelson v. Bowler, 626 F.2d
853, 856 (C.C.P.A. 1980)) (emphasis omitted).
325. See Sean B. Seymore, Making Patents Useful, 98 MINN. L. REV. 1046, 1060–66
(2014).
326. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 521–22, 535 (1966).
327. Id. at 536.
328. Seymore, supra note 325.
329. In re ‘318 Patent Infringement Litig., 583 F.3d 1317, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citing
Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1373).
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, J.D., The Problem of New Uses, 5 YALE J.
HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 717 (2005); Benjamin Roin, Solving the Problem of New
Uses (Oct. 13, 2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Harvard Digital Access to
Scholarship), https://dash.harvard.edu/handle/1/11189865 [https://perma.cc/ZAS2-93ZK].
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and framing it in a way that it can be successfully tackled by researchers
can be generative of many new insights and new solutions that indirectly
benefit the public. Indeed, this is the view that the Federal Circuit
adopted prior to Brenner, in its “inherent utility” doctrine, which recog-
nized that “pure research often has an intrinsic utility despite no immedi-
ate use for the fruits of the research.”333 By ignoring the importance of
problem-finding and problem-framing to innovation, the utility doctrine
as applied to chemical and pharmaceutical innovation, as Sean Seymore
has remarked, “now has nothing to do with the invention’s inherent use-
fulness to a PHOSITA, ability to advance scientific knowledge, or poten-
tial to indirectly benefit the public.”334
3. Comparison with Psychological Approaches
The critique articulated here departs from previous analyses of patent
jurisprudence based on psychological understandings of creativity. Jeanne
Fromer, for example, has argued that patent law appropriately focuses on
problem solving, and not on problem finding.335 Fromer justifies this fo-
cus on problem solving with three interrelated arguments. First, “[t]he
psychological literature shows that . . . [o]ur culture cares about how well
an invention grounded in scientific or engineering principles solves an
identified problem rather than the fact that someone figured out that
there was a problem in the first place.”336 Second, engineers themselves
“believe that having solutions, developing valuable answers, and being
analytical are essential to scientific creativity.”337 Third, although basic
research scientists have long-emphasized the importance of finding and
framing a problem, the same is not the case for the field of applied sci-
ences—which is the proper field of reference for patent law.338
While our culture and some scientists themselves may indeed value
problem solving over problem finding and framing, this likely reflects bi-
ases and incorrect perceptions about the origin of innovation. For exam-
ple, one sociological study of innovation in the cellular telephone,
designer jeans, and medical devices industries found that the engineers
and managers involved in product development in these areas displayed a
fundamental bias towards “analytical problem-solving” “that grew out of
[their] training [that] . . . reflected an analytical approach to the overall
task of product development and to the roles of managers and engineers
in this process.”339 This study also concluded, however, that problem-
finding and framing was a crucial, yet underappreciated, element in the
333. Salim A. Hasan, A Call for Reconsideration of the Strict Utility Standard in Chemi-
cal Patent Practice, 9 HIGH TECH. L. J. 245, 253–54 (1994) (citing In re Nelson, 280 F.2d
172, 180–81 (C.C.P.A. 1960)).
334. Seymore, supra note 325, at 1066.
335. Fromer, supra note 118, at 1444, 1489.
336. Fromer, supra note 118, at 1469.
337. Fromer, supra note 118, at 1470.
338. Fromer, supra note 118, at 1502–03.
339. LESTER & PIORE, supra note 178, at 34.
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development of cellular telephones, designer jeans, and medical de-
vices.340 Moreover, a focus on problem finding and framing does not pre-
clude a concurrent focus on problem solving. Indeed valuing (and
incentivizing) problem-finding and problem-framing is likely to lead to
more problems being solved: the rate-limiting step in many important in-
novations is the re-framing of existing problems so that they are amena-
ble to solution by tools present in other communities. Finally, the science/
technology distinction, while valid, is in many ways artificial.341 The ap-
plied scientists who work in product-development companies have the
same training and many of the same community affiliations as those in
universities.342 Indeed university education in specific subdisciplines so-
cializes engineers into communities of practice—and the bias towards
problem-solving emerges in part from the nature of that education.343
Most importantly, sociological studies, including the Oncofertility case
study described in Part III, find that problem-finding and problem-fram-
ing are also crucial in product development.344 Indeed, many of the
problems found by the Oncofertility consortium have led to patentable
innovations, such as a biomesh for growing eggs in vitro.345
C. CORRECTING MISTAKEN ASSUMPTIONS
Three points emerge from the analysis in the previous two sections:
first, the free flow of information assumption has taken hold in patent law
doctrine, with courts often assuming that, as access costs have declined,
information will flow freely across subcommunities of practice. Second,
the Federal Circuit has provided no principled way to define what consti-
tutes a field of endeavor or to “predict how narrowly or broadly a court
will define the relevant field of the inventor’s endeavor or the problem to
be solved.”346 Third, courts have failed to appreciate the importance of
problem-finding and problem-framing in innovation.
Incorporating social network research to patentability analysis both
challenges this uniformly expansive view of the prior art and gives
lawmakers and courts tools to define the relevant field (or community) of
invention and its interactions with other neighboring fields (or communi-
ties). Network theory can provide tools and metrics that can turn the sub-
jective analogous arts inquiry into a more objective one.
Social network researchers have long used citations in academic papers
to construct networks of communities of academic researchers and to
340. LESTER & PIORE, supra note 178, at 8.
341. I have made this point elsewhere. See Pedraza-Farin˜a, supra note 282, at 854–56.
342. Pedraza-Farin˜a, supra note 282, at 855–856.
343. LESTER & PIORE, supra note 178, at 154–55.
344. See supra Part II.
345. See, e.g., Hydrogel Compositions, U.S. Patent Application No. PCT/US2008/
053287 (filed Feb. 7, 2008), Publication No. WO 2008098109, at A2 (published Aug. 14,
2008), https://google.com/patents/WO2008098109A2?cl=en [https://perma.cc/P457-BZUH].
346. Bagley, supra note 283, at 270; see also Sherkow, supra note 287, at 1114; Simon,
supra note 283, at 354.
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identify structural holes among them.347 Researchers are beginning to
employ the same tools for patent citations and to use patent citation net-
works to reconstruct the relevant communities of practice (or technologi-
cal fields) and their change over time.348 Social network analysis can be
useful to better define technology subclasses used by the PTO and inter-
national bodies to classify patent applications and assign them to particu-
lar Art Units.349 But more narrowly for the purpose of this Article, the
PTO can use its existing technological subclasses—which it uses to clas-
sify patent applications350—to ask the question: have these technology
subclasses been combined in a patent application (by another inventor)
before? If so, is the combination rare or common? A rare or novel combi-
nation suggests the presence of a structural hole between those technol-
ogy classes and counsels against considering information from those two
domains as analogous art. Rather than rely on expert testimony alone,
patent applicants before the PTO (or litigants before a court) could also
introduce evidence that a particular patent employed a rare combination
of technological subclasses as evidence of non-obviousness. Conversely, a
frequent combination of technological subclasses indicates those commu-
nities are in close contact and that the information pertaining to those
classes is likely analogous prior art. Indeed, researchers Lee Fleming,
Santiago Mingo, and David Chen have used this methodology to track
the emergence of new pairs of patent subclasses.351
Giving problem-finding and problem-framing its due in the innovative
process will require changes in courts’ articulation of the analogous arts
and utility doctrines. First, problems found or re-framed by the inventor
should not be used as a starting point in the obviousness analysis. If there
was no known “problem” to be solved, prong 2 of the analogous art in-
quiry is simply inapposite.352 Second, social network theory shows that
the problems that are harder to find (and more likely to lead to break-
through innovation) are those that sit at the intersection of two or more
communities of practice that are separated by a structural hole. For exam-
ple, the problem of how to provide fertility options to cancer patients, as
347. See, e.g., Martin Rosvall & Carl T. Bergstrom, Maps of Random Walks on Com-
plex Networks Reveal Community Structure, 105 PNAS 1118 (2007), http://www.pnas.org/
content/105/4/1118.full.pdf [https://perma.cc/756N-FY7B].
348. See, e.g., Peter Erdi et al., Prediction of Emerging Technologies Based on Analysis
of the U.S. Patent Citation Network, 95 SCIENTOMETRICS 225 (2013); RYAN WHALEN,
KNOWLEDGE RECOMBINATION, DIFFUSION AND RESEARCH TEAM COMPOSITION: UNDER-
STANDING 21ST CENTURY INNOVATION (unpublished dissertation, Northwestern Univer-
sity) (dissertation on file with author).
349. A description of the international patent classification system can be found here:
International Patent Classification (IPC), WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo
.int/classifications/ipc/en [https://perma.cc/7XEM-LGZ3]; The U.S. Patent classification
system is described here: U.S. Classes by Number with Title Menu, U.S. PAT. & TRADE-
MARK OFF. (USPTO), https://www.uspto.gov/web/patents/classification/selectnumwithtitle
.htm [https://perma.cc/YW46-7GTG].
350. USPTO, supra note 349.
351. Fleming, supra note 138, at 444.
352. Federal Circuit caselaw is conflicting on this point—leading to a petition for certio-
rari in Scientific Plastic Products v. Biotage. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 322.
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well as the narrower research problem of how to explain the difference
between mouse and monkey models of egg development, emerged at the
intersection of oncology and two subcommunities of reproductive en-
docrinologists. Thus, a problem found by a patentee whose patent in-
cludes a novel combination of technological subclasses constitutes strong
indicia of non-obviousness—one that should be taken into account along-
side other more traditional indicia of non-obviousness such as “long-felt
need” and “failure of others.”353
The case for finding utility when the “problem found or framed” is
directly useful to the scientific community but only indirectly useful to the
public is complicated by the concern, articulated by the Court in Brenner,
that rewarding problem-finding alone will “confer power to block off
whole areas of scientific development, without compensating benefit to
the public.”354 In other words, requiring an invention to have an immedi-
ate public benefit is thought to guard against excessive patent scope. Con-
cerns about patent scope are very important. Research described in Parts
II and III demonstrates how problem finding at the intersection of multi-
ple fields can give rise to entire new areas of research, as was the case
with the creation of the field of Oncofertility. Giving inventors a patent
for finding and framing a valuable problem therefore has the very real
potential of “block[ing] off whole areas of scientific development.”355
There are, however, other doctrines better suited to the task of policing
patent scope than utility—namely, patentable subject matter, enable-
ment, and written description.356 After all, the inventor of a new chemical
compound need only find a single plausible use for a compound to obtain
a patent that can then block the practice of any other future uses discov-
ered by a third party, even if those future uses are more socially benefi-
cial than the initial use discovered by the patentee. The Federal Circuit’s
previous “inherent utility” doctrine, articulated in Nelson,357 struck the
right balance by recognizing that an invention does not lack utility if it
provides an immediate benefit to the research community, despite its in-
direct benefit to the public.
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR INNOVATION THEORY
Understanding when and why information does not flow freely across
communities of practice, and how creative ideas emerge, has implications
for innovation policy beyond patent law doctrine. By identifying specific
social barriers to information flow and recombination, the taxonomy of
social network failures developed in Part III serves as a guide to design
targeted cures and to evaluate their effectiveness. Market failure analyses
of innovation have framed academic debates on the merits and demerits
353. Turner, supra note 304, at 362.
354. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966).
355. See id.
356. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 112(a) (2012); see also Seymore, supra note 325, at 1083.
357. In re Nelson, 280 F.2d 172, 184–85 (C.C.P.A. 1960).
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of different innovation levers (for example, patents, grants, prizes) by
providing an organizing question: given our understanding of why mar-
kets fail to optimally induce innovation, which type of intervention can
best cure market failures?358 Likewise, social network analysis invites
comparison of these innovation levers, by asking: given our understand-
ing of why structural folds fail to form, which type of intervention can
best cure social network failures?
Although addressing (and correcting) hidden assumptions behind pat-
ent law doctrine is necessary to bring patent law in line with the realities
of scientific and technical research, in the final analysis, patent law as an
innovation tool may not be the most efficient policy to address social net-
work failures. An answer to this question requires viewing innovation
through a broader lens that includes the role of private ordering, govern-
ment grants, prizes, and taxes. The scope of this question is necessarily
broad, and its full answer is beyond the scope of this Article. The remain-
der of this Article, however, begins this analysis by outlining how under-
standing the three barriers to information flow and recombination
described in Part III—(1) lack of social-cognitive ties, (2) cognitive dis-
tance, and (3) different (clashing) evaluative frames—can be harnessed to
design policy interventions. This Part also sets out a research agenda with
social network failures as its guide.
A. BUILDING KNOWLEDGE INFRASTRUCTURES
As Part III explained, this first social barrier to information flow and
recombination stems directly from Burt’s studies on structural holes in
the information space: how a community member searches for informa-
tion and prioritizes found information is deeply informed by whom she
knows (a social tie) and what those connections know (a cognitive tie).359
Curing the lack of social-cognitive ties across communities of practice re-
quires more than simply making information “free” or “open.” For exam-
ple, recall that research results from the three different communities
involved in tobacco research (and described in the case study in Part III)
were in the public domain for more than a decade before they were pro-
ductively recombined.
The National Cancer Institute addressed the lack of social-cognitive
ties across communities involved in tobacco research through the creation
of a knowledge infrastructure that made research from all NCI-funded
communities working on tobacco easily available and searchable.360 The
key goal of a knowledge infrastructure is to serve as a repository of infor-
mation that is curated and organized in particular ways that allow previ-
ously unseen connections to be made across communities working on
358. See supra Part I.
359. See supra Part II.A.
360. See, e.g., Leischow et al., supra note 201, at S199–S200 (describing NCI’s knowl-
edge infrastructure for tobacco research).
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related topics and/or problems.361 Knowledge infrastructures can enable
both raw and published data sharing, as well as the sharing of know-
how.362 They can also directly facilitate personal connections across com-
munities of practice.363 Knowledge infrastructures could also help inven-
tors and the PTO search patent disclosures and other documents—and
identify relevant prior art—more effectively.364
How to build effective knowledge infrastructures, either through gov-
ernmental initiatives such as those by the National Cancer Institute or
through private funding at universities, research centers, or private firms,
and how these infrastructures interact with patent law and policy, should
be an important area of future research in intellectual property law and
policy.365
Creating knowledge infrastructures is particularly effective in remedy-
ing social network failures when the only social barrier dividing commu-
nities is lack of socio-cognitive ties. When communities can understand
and interpret each other’s research, and when they share evaluative
frames, knowledge infrastructures are a very powerful tool in solving so-
cial network problems. But in the absence of deep interaction between
communities, knowledge infrastructures won’t help create a creole at the
intersection of communities to find and solve shared problems. To the
contrary, one important concern is that knowledge infrastructures,
361. For example, the Tobacco Informatics Grid (TobIG) uses “state-of-the-science in-
formation technology and networking software to link tobacco data, researchers, and re-
sources (e.g., citation indexes, data mining, and visualization software).” Leischow et al.,
supra note 201, at S199. Another knowledge infrastructure in nanotechnology, “was cre-
ated to “accelerate the vetting of new knowledge and to enable effective data utilization.”
NSI: Nanotechnology Knowledge Infrastructure (NKI)—Enabling National Leadership in
Sustainable Design, U.S. NAT’L NANOTECHNOLOGY INITIATIVE, http://www.nano.gov/NKI-
Portal [https://perma.cc/4AK2-MRBM] (last visited Mar. 25, 2017). The Oncofertility Con-
sortium also developed a knowledge infrastructure, the “National Physician’s
Cooperative,” to share research tools and protocols for fertility preservation techniques
among consortium members. Pedraza-Farin˜a, supra note 233, at 1; see also EDWARDS ET
AL., KNOWLEDGE INFRASTRUCTURES: INTELLECTUAL FRAMEWORKS AND RESEARCH
CHALLENGES 23–24 (2013), http://knowledgeinfrastructures.org [https://perma.cc/G4MQ-
FU3Q]; Michael J. Madison, Knowledge Curation, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 957 (2011)
(describing the importance of considering the role of knowledge curation in fostering
innovation).
362. See, e.g., Leischow et al., supra note 201, at S199–S200; Pedraza-Farin˜a, supra note
233, at 15 (describing raw data, published data, and know-how sharing in the National
Physicians Cooperative).
363. See, e.g., Leischow et al., supra note 201, at S196 (advocating a “network-centric
approach [to public health] that encourages relationship-building among and between indi-
viduals and organizations across traditional disciplines and fields in order to achieve rele-
vant goals and objectives”).
364. See, e.g., Prithwiraj Choudhury & Tarun Khanna, Ex-ante Information Provision
and Innovation: Natural Experiment of Herbal Patent Prior Art Adoption at the USPTO
and EPO 3 (Harvard Bus. Sch. Working Paper No. 14-079, 2015), http://www.hbs.edu/
faculty/Publication%20Files/14-079_2fb4af35-dc4e-467d-8f25-512398286391.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/AU4Z-T4JW] (arguing that the codification of prior art in easy-to-search databases
improves decision-making at the PTO).
365. Brett Frischmann has written persuasively about the importance of recognizing the
indirect—but foundational—benefits of infrastructure to innovation. See, e.g., BRETT M.
FRISCHMANN, INFRASTRUCTURE: THE SOCIAL VALUE OF SHARED RESOURCES xv, 253
(2012).
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through their “commodification” of data (i.e. “the presentation of
datasets as complete, interchangeable products in readily exchanged for-
mats”366), “may encourage misinterpretation, over reliance on weak or
suspect data sources, and ‘data arbitrage’ based more on availability than
on quality”367 across distant communities of practice. This is because
what constitutes a “unit” of data is often not commensurable across com-
munities of practice, which have different ways of valuing, collecting, and
analyzing data. In other words, the meaning of data depends on under-
standing how, where, when, and by whom they were created.368
What additional tools, then, could be harnessed to cure “cognitive dis-
tances” and “different (clashing) evaluative frames”? The following two
sections begin this analysis.
B. BUILDING TEAMS WITH OVERLAPPING MEMBERSHIP STRUCTURES
As research on structural folds makes clear, bridging large cognitive
distances—often a prerequisite for breakthrough innovation—requires
the frequent, face-to-face interaction of members from the relevant dis-
tant communities.369 Indeed, when communities’ cognitive distances are
large—as was the case with the mathematics and computer science com-
munities involved in solving the Kadison-Singer problem—deep interac-
tion is often a precondition for the creation of useful knowledge
infrastructures that span these communities. This is because before useful
data can be collated, curated, and coded, communities must develop a
shared understanding (a creole) regarding what constitutes data worth
coding and storing, how to collect relevant data, and how to classify it.370
The policy question for remedying this second type of social network fail-
ure then becomes: how can policy tools be leveraged to (1) identify (and
frame) complex problems whose solution requires expertise from multi-
366. EDWARDS ET AL., supra note 361, at 7.
367. EDWARDS ET AL., supra note 361, at 7.
368. EDWARDS ET AL., supra note 361, at 7 (citing Sean Bechhofer et al., Why Linked
Data Is Not Enough for Scientists, in 2010 SIXTH IEEE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON
E-SCIENCE 300 (2010); Matt Burton & Steven J. Jackson, Constancy and Change in Scien-
tific Collaboration: Coherence and Integrity in Long-Term Ecological Data Production, in
2012 45TH HAWAII INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SYSTEM SCIENCE 353 (2012); C.
BOWKER ET AL., “RAW DATA” IS AN OXYMORON (Lisa Gitelman ed., 2013); David Ribes
& Steven J. Jackson, Data Bite Man: The Work of Sustaining Long-Term Data Collection,
in “RAW DATA” IS AN OXYMORON (Lisa Gitelman ed., 2013)); see also Alaina G. Kanfer et
al., Modeling Distributed Knowledge Processes in Next Generation Multidisciplinary Alli-
ances, in Information Systems Frontiers 317 (2000); Ann Zimmerman, A Socio-Technical
Framework for Cyberinfrastructure Design, in E-SOCIAL SCIENCE CONFERENCE (Oct. 7–9,
2007), http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/down
load?doi=10.1.1.108.2422&rep=rep1&type=pdf (citing K.A. Lawrence Walking the Tight-
rope: The Balancing Acts of a Large e-Research Project, 15 COMPUTER SUPPORTED COOP-
ERATIVE WORK 385 (2006); Charlotte P. Lee et al., The Human Infrastructure of
Cyberinfrastructure, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER SUPPORTED
COOPERATIVE WORK (2006); David Ribes & Thomas A. Finholt, Tensions Across the
Scales: Planning Infrastructure for the Long-Term, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNA-
TIONAL ACM SIGGROUP CONFERENCE ON SUPPORTING GROUP WORK (2007)).
369. See supra Part II.B.
370. Supra Part II.B.
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ple communities; and (2) foster the sustained, deep interaction between
those communities to address those problems?
In the case of the Kadison-Singer problem, the key to its solution was
understanding that it could be framed as equivalent to a problem in com-
puter science, for which computer scientists had developed unique tools.
As Part III explains, solving the Kadison-Singer problem also brought
together groups of computer scientists and mathematicians to develop a
shared language to address its myriad implications—in effect, seeking to
create a structural fold where new recombinations can take place. For
example, mathematicians and computer scientists have organized joint
conferences and Kadison-Singer tutorials.371 This is, in effect, a “private
ordering” response to the problem of creating structural folds. It is too
early to tell whether these novel teams of computer scientists and mathe-
maticians working on the implications of the solution of the Kadison-
Singer problem will develop the kind of sustained, deep interaction nec-
essary for cross-cutting innovation. But what research on structural folds
has taught us is that any initiative seeking to foster the development of
boundary-crossing teams should ensure that at least some of its partici-
pants have overlapping memberships in multiple communities, as well as
pre-existing social relationships across community boundaries.372 Addi-
tional research should seek to further elucidate the characteristics of suc-
cessful boundary-crossing teams, as well as how private ordering
solutions can interact with policy initiatives such as grants, prizes, or pat-
ents, to both assemble and maintain such successful teams.373
This private-ordering solution, however, leaves unexplored how to fos-
ter the identification and framing of complex problems at the intersection
of multiple communities in the first place. Restructuring the obviousness
and utility doctrines to value problem-finding and problem-framing is one
partial solution, as Part IV discusses.374 But more direct interventions are
also possible. For example, government grants or prizes can be structured
to incentivize the identification of problems whose solution requires the
combined expertise from multiple disciplines and subdisciplines. This is
precisely how the NIH Roadmap grant that funded the Oncofertility con-
sortium and eight others was structured.375 It bears noting, however, that
the Interdisciplinary Consortia grant was unusual, as most grants are cur-
rently structured along disciplinary lines.376 For example, the NIH, the
371. See, e.g., Klarreich, supra note 15.
372. See supra Parts II.B & II.C.
373. There is a growing group of intellectual property scholars that has begun to tackle
these questions. See, e.g., Katherine J. Strandburg, Derogatory to Professional Character?
The Evolution of Physician Anti-Patenting Norms, in CREATIVITY WITHOUT LAW: CHAL-
LENGING THE ASSUMPTIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Kate Darling & Aaron Perza-
nowski eds., 2017); Dan L. Burk, Patent Silences, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1603 (2016) (arguing
that patents can serve as “boundary objects” to facilitate interaction across disciplines);
Pedraza-Farin˜a, supra note 233 (describing how a successful boundary-crossing team de-
ploys patent law, grants, and informal norms in data-sharing).
374. See supra Part IV.
375. Zerhouni, supra note 234.
376. Zerhouni, supra note 234.
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nation’s largest grant-making organization, gives individual Institutes
grant-making authority over their specialized field and typically assem-
bles grant review panels with relatively narrow expertise.377 Legal schol-
arship on intellectual property and innovation law more broadly has paid
comparatively little attention to how to design grants and prizes to foster
innovation, and how grant-making interacts with other innovation poli-
cies—and patents in particular.
When the barrier to assembling boundary-crossing teams is simply the
cognitive distance between two communities—for example, in the
Kadison-Singer problem, the inability of mathematician/computer science
teams to understand each other’s disciplinary tools and ways of tackling
problems—identifying and framing the common problem and providing a
space and platform for sustained interaction is likely sufficient to cure this
social network failure. But the final social network failure identified in
this Article—different (or clashing) evaluative frames—presents an addi-
tional set of problems. Communities with different, and often clashing,
frames to evaluate the worth of research projects, tools and results, may
be unwilling to engage in shared dialogue. The next section analyzes how
this third type of social network failure can be remedied.
C. EMPHASIZING PROBLEM-BASED VS. DISCIPLINE-BASED FUNDING
As the Oncofertility case study in Part III illustrates, the different eval-
uative frames used by oncologists and endocrinologists led to different
research priorities and practice styles that kept the two communities from
working together on addressing the impact of cancer treatment on fertil-
ity.378 As the case study also emphasizes, an important barrier to collabo-
ration was the educational, professional, and funding structures of the
two communities. At the educational level, the training of oncology and
endocrinology professionals reinforced their divergent frames (focused
on improving survival rates for the former, and on understanding infertil-
ity in “otherwise healthy” patient populations for the latter).379 At a pro-
fessional level, treatment guidelines for oncologists and endocrinologists
sidelined the issue of fertility and cancer treatments.380 Finally, at a fund-
ing and evaluation level, both university departments and grant review
boards typically emphasize knowledge and expert use of the tools of their
particular discipline to address problems considered salient by that disci-
pline—often discouraging interdisciplinary projects.381
What all of these social barriers have in common is a discipline-based—
as opposed to a problem-based—approach to training, funding and evalu-
377. See NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, NIH PEER REVIEW: GRANTS AND COOPERATIVE
AGREEMENTS, https://grants.nih.gov/grants/peerreview22713webv2.pdf [https://perma.cc/
UAA9-4U73].
378. See supra Part III.C.
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ation. The NIH Interdisciplinary Consortia grant presents a useful
counterexample of a successful problem-based approach to funding. In-
stead of asking for proposals that fit within the disciplinary purview of a
particular NIH institute, the Consortia grant explicitly asked researchers
to identify problems that required joint expertise, both at the level of the
scientists involved and of the funding institutes.382 A problem-based ap-
proach to project evaluation could also diminish disciplinary resistance to
considering alternative research tools. For example, some conferences
have instituted a novel multi-methodological review process for bound-
ary-crossing projects.383 And in the case of patent law, a reframed obvi-
ousness and utility inquiry that recognizes the existence of social network
failures, and rewards those who successfully breach them, would serve
the same goal.
Social Network Failure Example Cure
Lack of social-cognitive ties Tobacco Build knowledge
Research infrastructure (e.g. Tobacco
Informatics Grid (TobIG);
structured patent prior art
search tools)
Cognitive distance Kadison-Singer Build teams with overlapping
Problem membership structures
(through private initiatives,
special grants and prizes,
reframed obviousness, and
utility inquiry)
Different (clashing) evaluative Oncofertility Emphasize problem-based (vs.







Figure 6: Designing Innovation Policy to Cure Social Network Failures
CONCLUSION
Relying on original case studies of innovation and theoretical and em-
pirical research in the sociology of networks, this Article identified and
characterized a novel set of innovation failures tied to the social structure
of knowledge-making that underlies market transactions: social network
innovation failures. Understanding how social network innovation fail-
382. See Zerhouni, supra note 234.
383. See, e.g., Nagib Callaos, A Multi-Methodological Review Process for Multi-Discipli-
nary Conferences, 8TH INTERNATIONAL MULTI-CONFERENCE ON COMPLEXITY, INFORMAT-
ICS & CYBERNETICS: IMCIC 2017 (Mar. 21–24, 2017), http://www.iiis-spring17.org/imcic/
Website/MMRPfMDC.asp?vc=26 [https://perma.cc/L4QC-F4VE].
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ures emerge and are maintained is an important complement to tradi-
tional market failure analyses of innovation, which have long guided
policy interventions—including in patent law. Indeed, the three specific
types of social network failures identified in this Article: (1) lack of so-
cial-cognitive ties; (2) cognitive distance; and (3) different (clashing) eval-
uative frames, recommend the reorganization of innovation policy to
prioritize the building of knowledge infrastructures and the restructuring
of research funding from a discipline-based to a problem-based model.
Viewing innovation from the perspective of social network failures thus
provides a complementary toolkit with which to both design and analyze
innovation policies.
A second contribution of this Article is to expose and challenge two
assumptions made in market failure models of innovation, and reflected
in patent law doctrine: the free-flow of information, and the treatment of
ideas as exogenous to economic analysis. Social network research shows
that the rate-limiting step in breakthrough innovation, new problem-find-
ing and problem-framing, happens at structural folds: areas poised with
“generative tension” where cognitively-distant communities interact.
Structural folds, however, are fragile and rare: idea exchange at structural
folds is often threatened by structural holes in the information space (i.e.
social barriers to information flow). The Supreme Court and the Federal
Circuit, however, have failed to appreciate both the important difficulties
in information flow across some subcommunities of practice, and the cru-
cial role played by problem-finding and problem-framing in innovation.
Thus, an important direct pay-off of a social network failure framework is
to offer specific doctrinal changes to obviousness and utility jurispru-
dence to better align patent law doctrine with the sociological realities of
scientific and technological research.
Finally, patent law not only reflects understandings about how scien-
tific and technical research is organized on the ground, but also has an
(expected) feedback effect on the pace and direction of innovation itself.
Therefore, a key question that remains to be fully explored is: how does
the current structure of patent law influence the exchange and recombi-
nation of ideas across structural holes? This Article has emphasized the
likely negative effect of current obviousness and utility doctrines, which
discount problem-finding and problem-framing, on boundary-crossing in-
novation. But further research is needed to understand how the social
barriers to information flow and recombination identified in this Article
interact both with other informal social norms of research and with for-
mal structures designed to incentivize innovation such as patents, grants,
and prizes.384
384. Legal scholars have begun to tackle these questions. See, e.g., Burk, supra note 373
(arguing that patents can serve as “boundary objects” that coordinate research across inno-
vator communities); Strandburg, supra note 373, at 81 (documenting how physician user-
innovators use patents as a “boundary spanning tool” to coordinate joint innovation with
commercial firms); Pedraza-Farin˜a, supra note 233 (analyzing how the Oncofertility con-
sortium relied on informal norms and formal incentives such as grants to structure collabo-
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COLUM. L. REV. 1377 (2010); Matthew Jennejohn, The Private Order of Innovation Net-
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harm self-sustaining information sharing commons—such as open-source and crowdsourc-
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for Cooperative Innovation, 41 FLA. STATE L. REV. 1067, 1070 (2014) (arguing that patents
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upon.”); Clark D. Asay, A Case for the Public Domain, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 753 (2013); Jason
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HARV. J.L. TECH. 1 (2012); Greg R. Vetter, A Public Domain Approach to Free and Open
Source Software?, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. FURTHERMORE (2014).
